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INTRODUCTION 
The pragmatics of privatization are terrain for a critical 
understanding of the relationship between government and business 
under the conditions associated with the globalization of neoliberal 
capitalism.1  Prison privatization is especially significant in this 
context, given the fact that—for privatization advocates and critics 
alike, in the United States and elsewhere—prisons represent a 
bellwether for broader questions about the scope of government.2  As 
John Donohue writes, “[f]ew roles in our American society seem 
more inherently ‘public’ than those of the police, the judges and the 
jailers.”3  Given the traditional association of prisons with core 
governmental functions,4 prison privatization is strategically key to 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Our usage of these terms is explained below.  As Leibling and Sparks have 
observed: “[T]he changing distribution of powers and responsibilities for the 
allocation or delivery of punishment and quasi-penal control (most obviously 
imprisonment and cognate forms of detention and segregation) between states and 
other actors cannot but be a matter of fundamental interest.” Alison Liebling & 
Richard Sparks, Editors’ Preface, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 283, 283 (2002). 
 2. For an extensive summary of policy and legal issues encountered in states’ 
prison privatization initiatives, see generally JUDITH HACKETT ET AL., THE COUNCIL 
OF STATE GOV’TS & THE URBAN INST., ISSUES IN CONTRACTING FOR THE PRIVATE 
OPERATION OF PRISONS AND JAILS (1987).  For comprehensive histories of prison 
privatization and critical accounts of current debates, see generally CAPITALIST 
PUNISHMENT: PRISON PRIVATIZATION & HUMAN RIGHTS (Andrew Coyle et al. eds., 
2003); MICHAEL A. HALLETT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL RACE 
PERSPECTIVE (2006); PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE (David Shichor & Michael J. Gilbert eds., 2001); BERT USEEM & ANNE 
MORRISON PIEHL, PRISON STATE: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2008). 
 3. JOHN D. DONAHUE, PRISONS FOR PROFIT: PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE 
INTERESTS 3 (Econ. Policy Inst. ed. 1988). 
 4. This Article concerns the U.S. experience, but the British debates are to some 
extent parallel.  Regarding prison privatization, Sir Leon Radzinowicz has stated: 
[I]n a democracy grounded on the rule of law and public accountability the 
enforcement of penal legislation . . . should be the undiluted responsibility 
of the state.  It is one thing for private companies to provide services for the 
prison system but it is an altogether different matter for bodies whose 
motivation is primarily commercial to have coercive powers over prisoners. 
Elaine Genders, Legitimacy, Accountability and Private Prisons, 4 PUNISHMENT & 
SOC’Y 285, 289 (2002) (citation omitted).  Genders’s article concerns the private 
prison debate in the United Kingdom—a strong parallel involves incarceration as a 
constitutional preserve. See generally id.  Genders is critical of the idea of core 
governmental functions as an inherent obstacle to privatization, in that 
privatization—as delegation by the executive—does not automatically remove 
imprisonment from the aegis of the state. See id. at 286.  The Supreme Courts of 
Israel and India have recently ruled private prisons unconstitutional. See Judith 
Resnik, Globalization(s), Privatization(s), Constitutionalization, and Statization: 
Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 162, 
162 (2013).  On Israeli debates over core governmental functions as limits to 
privatization, see generally Richard Harding, State Monopoly of ‘Permitted Violation 
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privatization proponents, as a test of the very notion of core 
government.5  Core government—implying a non-delegable “duty to 
govern”—is itself an issue in debate.6  The centrality of prison 
privatization to wider debates about privatization gives us our starting 
point in this Article.  We agree with Frank Michelman’s assessment 
that privatization raises constitutional questions in a way that 
globalization does not, at least not automatically.7  Taken to an 
extreme, or in its most ideological form, one might imagine—with 
Michelman—that privatization makes government an “empty shell.”8  
However, as Elaine Genders and others have noted, in the prison 
context, privatization does not automatically challenge the idea of 
core governmental functions since it does not automatically remove 
the state altogether from the process.9  Setting up contractual terms, 
standards, monitoring procedures, accountability, and conditions for 
rescission may all remain with the state.10 What, then, is the problem 
with prison privatization?  In what follows, rather than discuss this 
question in traditional binary terms—public versus private, or more 
efficient versus less efficient—we read the private prison debate as a 
test of the government’s ability to mediate the public’s responsibility 
for the human conditions of citizenship.  This enables us to take a 
                                                                                                                 
of Human Rights’: The Decision of the Supreme Court of Israel Prohibiting the 
Private Operation and Management of Prisons, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 131 (2012).  
On the constitutionality of privatization in the United States, see Gillian E. Metzger, 
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1437–39 (2003). 
 5. Charles H. Logan formulates the position in this way:  
The privatization of corrections, or punishment, is an especially significant 
part of the broader privatization movement.  By challenging the 
government’s monopoly over one of its ‘core’ functions, the idea directly 
threatens the assumption that certain activities are essentially and 
necessarily governmental . . . .  Thus, privatization in the area of criminal 
justice generally, and of imprisonment particularly, plays an important part 
in a broad, ideological debate over the proper scope and size of government. 
CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS & PROS 4 (1990). 
 6. “Domestic law scholars and policymakers have long debated the question of 
whether privatization undermines core public law values in the United States.” Laura 
A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY 335, 335 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 
2009).  On the “duty to govern,” see generally Paul Verkuil, Outsourcing and the 
Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY, 
supra, at 310. 
 7. See Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1063, 1073 (2000). 
 8. See id. at 1065. 
 9. Genders, supra note 4, at 289–90. 
 10. See id. at 300; see also Alexander Volokh, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, 
Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L REV. 1868, 1870 (2002). 
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broader perspective on what is at stake in these debates, especially for 
the prisoners involved, when the state decides to privatize. 
Our findings, thus, challenge assumptions that would situate prison 
privatization as a test of government’s scope.  For one thing, 
privatization itself is a form of governmental action, and may involve 
various forms of control on the part of the contracting agencies.11 
More fundamentally for our purposes, the history we relate shows 
that privatization is not a unified phenomenon; prison privatization 
has a long and particular history that compels attention to diverse 
rationales and approaches.12  Moreover, that same history shows that 
prison privatization became a test of government’s scope only after a 
priority on limiting government was politicized and set in place as a 
matter of policy under the Reagan and Bush Administrations (and 
continued thereafter).  In relation to prisons, then, privatization 
should not be seen as a necessary response to a contemporary state of 
affairs, but a favored response, for reasons that predate the inmate 
explosion.13  Accordingly, we suggest that the key factors usually 
credited with causing the demand for private prisons arguably include 
the effects of a neoliberalization of public administration already well 
under way by the early 1980s.  These are among the issues pursued in 
the following sections. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. “When private regulation is harnessed by public regulation, structures of 
private governance are embedded and integrated into a broader framework of public 
oversight.” Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVT’L 
& ADMIN. L. 291, 317 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12. On the diversity of privatization in relation to public law, see generally Laura 
A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 383 
(2006).  On public law values in privatization, see also Michelman, supra note 7, at 
1073; see generally Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE 
L.J. 437 (2005); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003).  For analysis of democratic challenges, and human 
rights challenges, in prison privatization, see generally Alfred C. Aman Jr., 
Privatization and Democracy: Resources in Administrative Law, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 261 [hereinafter 
Aman, Privatization and Democracy]; Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization, Prisons, 
Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Province of Administrative 
Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511 (2005) [hereinafter Aman, Democracy 
Deficits in the U.S.]; Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem 
in Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477 (2001).  On democracy deficit in globalization, see 
generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING 
GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004) [hereinafter AMAN, THE 
DEMOCRACY DEFICIT]. 
 13. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON 
POPULATION BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS (2014), 
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf. 
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The “privatization of prisons” is a phrase that refers to many 
spheres of activity that are contractually separate and, in some ways 
(as we shall see), conceptually distinct—as some involve direct 
substitution of private-for-public providers, whereas others involve 
reconfigurations of purposes and policies.  As areas of activity and 
related potential for reform—prison labor, prison services, prison 
construction, and management—may all involve quite distinct forms 
of enterprise.  In this Article, we emphasize the human side of prison 
privatization—that is, those aspects of private sector involvement that 
affect inmates directly, such as their health care, nutrition, living 
conditions, and, especially for purposes of this Article, their labor.  
Looking ahead to our conclusions, one implication of our analysis is 
that direct human services—such as those that affect the dignity of the 
person, the integrity of the body, and the value of personal labor—
should be treated differently by the law governing privatization.  In 
these areas, in which people may be irreparably harmed, additional 
safeguards are warranted, along with more public involvement, and 
more provision for public involvement at the initial contract 
negotiation stages as well as rescission.  Direct human vulnerability 
mandates more direct forms of public participation than those more 
impersonal domains of government contracts dealing with, for 
example, the construction of roads or bridges, and routine service 
contracts in which expenses and revenues may be more definitive.  It 
is in this respect—namely, the human dimensions of prison 
contracts—that prison privatization may be more appropriately 
considered a bellwether for the provision of basic services, not just to 
inmates in public prisons, but also to other populations made 
vulnerable by confinement or other constraints, including labor 
precarity (structural underemployment), persistent poverty, chronic 
illness, or immigrant status. 
Our aim, therefore, is to reexamine some of the key terms of 
discussion surrounding prison privatization.  We propose a resetting 
of those terms in three respects.  First, we argue that the context of 
prison privatization should include the privatization movement and 
its relevance to the globalization of capital in the 1970s (and 
continuing today).  Second, resetting the context in this way lengthens 
the modern history of prison privatization from its conventional 
starting point in the prison-overcrowding crisis of the late 1980s and 
1990s,14 to show its emergence at least a decade earlier, as part of the 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-91-21, PRIVATE PRISONS: 
COST SAVINGS AND BOP’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY NEED TO BE RESOLVED 8–12 
(1991), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150187.pdf; U.S. GEN. 
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broader movement to privatization in state and federal government.  
Seen from that longer perspective, prison privatization is integral to 
privatization in other sectors, and, in turn, to the neoliberalization of 
government and global markets.  The longer view also leaves room 
for an account of prison privatization that considers aspects of 
privatization affecting the prison sector in addition to prison 
privatization per se.  In this Article, we discuss prison labor as a key 
element of that larger picture. 
Thus, third, we turn to prison labor.  We discuss two federal 
initiatives that involved the private sector in corrections well prior to 
prison privatization.  Both of these involved prison labor, though 
under substantially different models, and with different aims.  These 
initiatives—their similarities as well as their differences—shed light 
on the privatization of prison labor as a crucial through-line of reform 
from the 1970s, and even earlier, through the present day.  The more 
complete chronology that we advocate is rooted to debates—within 
government and between business and labor—about prison labor as a 
sector of the national and global work force.  Issues related to inmate 
labor are relevant to the analysis of prison privatization as well as to 
the potential for improving this aspect of our justice system through 
law.  In particular, they make visible the wider situation of those who 
labor in the current “post-Fordist” era outside of the prison walls.15  
We argue for acknowledging inmate labor as labor, as a fresh starting 
                                                                                                                 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-1BR,  PRISON CROWDING: ISSUES FACING THE 
NATION’S PRISON SYSTEMS 4–5 (1989), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/80/
77582.pdf. 
 15. “Post-Fordism” refers to a periodization of capitalism that, since the 1970s, 
has put a premium on flexibility—i.e., maximizing the mobility of capital for purposes 
of strategic investment and offloading of risk—as a key to successful competition in 
the global economy.  In contrast to Fordism (the mass production of the assembly 
line), post-Fordist enterprises retain their capacity for “flexible [capital] 
accumulation” by developing “flexible labor markets and geographies of 
production”—i.e., moving production to locations where labor and supplies can be 
found at minimal cost, and setting labor conditions such that workers themselves 
absorb the risks of fluctuating demand (by cyclical unemployment or suppressed 
wages).  While the specifics of such periodization (including its causes and effects) are 
issues of debate, we use the term as a general reference to the historical conditions 
that made “heightened competition, entrepreneurialism and neo-conservatism” 
central to the social organization of the economy in the United States.  On post-
Fordism as flexible accumulation, labor markets and geographies, see ASH AMIN, 
Post-Fordism: Models, Fantasies and Phantoms of Transition, in POST-FORDISM: A 
READER 1, 6 (Ash Amin ed., 1994).  On post-Fordism as heightened competition, 
entrepreneurialism, and neo-conservativism, see DAVID HARVEY, THE URBAN 
EXPERIENCE 13 (1989).  On “post-Fordist corrections,” see DARIO MELOSSI, 
CONTROLLING CRIME, CONTROLLING SOCIETY: THINKING ABOUT CRIME IN EUROPE 
AND AMERICA 237–41 (2008). 
2014] INMATE LABOR 361 
point for debates currently defined by the polarity of punishment and 
rehabilitation.  Revising the terms of discussion in these three ways 
(resetting context, lengthening the chronology, and focusing on the 
privatization of labor) improves one’s understanding of the 
development of prison privatization in relation to other aspects of the 
relationship between government and business under conditions of 
globalization. 
Our analysis proceeds in three main steps, each one providing the 
theme of one of the Article’s three main Parts.  Part I provides 
background by filling in the relevant connections between the 
globalization of capital and privatization in the United States—
resetting the privatized prison context and lengthening its timeline, as 
mentioned above.16  We emphasize the modern origins of prison 
privatization—that is, prison privatization since the 1970s—in the 
larger privatization movement.  In the first sections of Part I, we 
argue that the context of modern prison privatization is appropriately 
placed in the economic restructuring associated with the globalization 
of neoliberal capitalism.  The reforms associated with privatization 
are not just illustrative of a swing of the regulatory pendulum from 
liberal to conservative; rather, they represent a fundamental shift in 
the governing role now played by the state in this age of 
globalization.17  Appreciating the connections between globalization 
and privatization is thus key to the rest of the discussion, as prison 
privatization emerges as a domestic “face” of globalization.18 
                                                                                                                 
 16. For additional background to legislative, executive, and judicial responses to 
globalization at the federal level, see ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
IN A GLOBAL ERA 125–30 (1992) [hereinafter AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A 
GLOBAL ERA]; ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 
124–27; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, 
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1101, 1193–1201 (1988) [hereinafter Aman, Progress, Deregulatory Change, and 
the Rise of the Administrative Presidency]; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, 
Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 
1697–1700 (2002); see also CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, THE PARADOX OF RELEVANCE: 
ETHNOGRAPHY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 52 (2011).  Aman has 
dubbed these trends as indicative of  “the global age” of regulatory reform, carried 
out by a “globalizing state.”  Greenhouse has tracked the political mainstreaming of 
an approach to social policy that favored marketization as a regulatory mechanism in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  See generally GREENHOUSE, supra. 
 17. For discussion of the “globalizing state” and the “global era” of administrative 
law, see AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 16; Aman, 
Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, supra 
note 16. 
 18. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization from the Ground up: a Domestic 
Perspective, in THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE UNITED STATES: LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE 5–17 (Beverley Crawford et al. eds., 2008); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., 
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In the second part of Part I, we pursue those connections more 
specifically in relation to prison privatization.  Most discussions of 
prison privatization in the United States—among politicians, 
academics, and advocates alike—take as a given the development of 
prison privatization as a cost-efficient solution to the interrelated 
problems of prison population explosion and taxpayer resistance to 
expanding government budgets.19  These are important factors, but we 
suggest that additional sources of the various forms of prison 
privatization lie elsewhere.  We emphasize the early years of the 
prison privatization movement, as various paths for reforming an 
outmoded system eventually drew the attention of every branch of 
the federal government, many states, various business sectors, and 
other organizations in the United States.  These early efforts focused 
on prison labor as a primary site of private sector involvement.20 
In Part II, we turn to two major prison privatization initiatives, 
both of which involved key actors within the federal government, and 
both of which predate the prison-crowding crisis of the late 1980s.  
We compare these initiatives as distinct models of privatization, 
noting the federal uptake of the privatization movement’s emphasis 
                                                                                                                 
Private Prisons and the Democratic Deficit, in PRIVATE SECURITY, PUBLIC ORDER: 
THE OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND ITS LIMITS 87  (Simon Chesterman & 
Angelina Fisher eds., 2009); see also, AMAN, THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 
12, at 7, 101–105. 
 19. See infra Part II.  For examples especially relevant to policy issues affecting 
prison privatization, see generally GAIL S. FUNKE, NAT’L CTR. FOR INNOVATIONS IN 
CORRECTIONS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRISON INDUSTRIES: DISCUSSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Gaile S. Funke ed., 1986), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/Digitization/102295NCJRS.pdf; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PRIVATIZATION, 
PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (1988), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABB472.pdf; Prison Privatization, CORRECTIONS 
PROJECT, http://www.correctionsproject.com/corrections/pris_priv.htm (last visited 
June 27, 2014).  For a different starting point, cast in terms of the rise of 
managerialism and a concomitant policy shift toward punishment, see DAVID 
GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL 105–06 (2001). 
 20. By prison labor, we refer to the paid work of inmates.  Prison staff salaries are 
relevant to a larger discussion of prison finances and potential cost efficiencies; 
however, that is not our purpose in this Article.  On prison staff salaries as a factor in 
assessments of prison privatization, see JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS iii (2001), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf.  In 1995, as privatization advocates in 
Congress and elsewhere pressed to increase privatization, the growth of staff salaries 
and expanding expenditure for salaries represented the largest source of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons’ growth in expenditures. Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns and 
Challenges for the Future: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 3 (1995) (statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, 
Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/106064.pdf [hereinafter Bureau of Prisons: Recent 
Concerns]. 
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on reforming the financialization of government, as this was applied 
to the prison sector.21  Taking these early initiatives into account, we 
argue that the more convincing chronology for prison privatization 
would start the story in the modern efforts to privatize prison labor—
specifically in relation to Federal Prison Industries in the 1970s and 
1980s, and Congress’s creation of the Prison Industry Enhancement 
Certification Program (PIECP) in 1979.22  We review these 
developments, emphasizing their similarities and differences as 
privatization initiatives, and linking on-going debates about prison 
labor (particularly regarding minimum wage and the role of organized 
labor) to the global economic situation.  The focus on labor yields a 
more appropriate context for approaching prison privatization as part 
of the economic restructuring and deregulatory trends associated with 
globalization.23 
In Part III, we consider the implications of rethinking prison 
privatization in relation to the privatization trends of the 1970s and 
1980s.  Most importantly, attention to prison labor underscores the 
relevance of social conditions beyond prisons to the social conditions 
                                                                                                                 
 21. By “financialization,” we refer to an administrative priority on converting 
capital into marketable financial assets so as to maximize opportunities for profit 
and/or minimize fixed costs.  In the prison sector, for example, privatization 
advocates argued for broadening the role of the private sector in prison construction 
and management both to support efficiency and as a means of freeing up government 
assets for other uses with more growth potential. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 
PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND THE USE OF INCARCERATION (2004), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_prisonprivatization.pdf 
(discussing and critiquing the efficiency argument raised by advocates of 
privatization). 
 22. PIECP was established under the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, 
Pub. L. No. 96-157, § 827, 93 Stat. 1167, 1215.  Federal Prison Industries (FPI) was 
established in 1934 by Pub. L. No. 73-461, 48 Stat. 1211 and Exec. Order No. 6917, 
and was reauthorized in 1948 by the 1948 Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 851 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4121, 4122).  Since 1977, FPI has been known by the trade-
name “UNICOR.” See UNICOR, FACTORIES WITH FENCES: 75 YEARS OF CHANGING 
LIVES 24 (2009), available at https://www.unicor.gov/information/publications/pdfs/
corporate/CATMC1101_C.pdf. 
 23. On prison privatization as integral to economic restructuring in globalization, 
see Rebecca M. McLennan, The New Penal State: Globalization, History, and 
American Criminal Justice, 2 INTER-ASIA CULTURAL STUD. 407, 408 (2001) 
[hereinafter McLennan, The New Penal State].  In this Article, we do not address the 
long history of prison labor in the United States prior to the privatization movements 
of the 1970s and 1980s, although it remains relevant to debates, then and now, as the 
object of reform.  For detailed accounts, see REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF 
IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL 
STATE, 1776–1941, at 87–192 (2008) [hereinafter MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF 
IMPRISONMENT], on the history of partnerships between business and prison agencies, 
and various prison labor regimes, particularly those involving contracts and leased 
labor. 
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of the prison itself—in particular, as breadwinners, family members, 
community members, and, more generally, the “civil rights 
landscape” of citizenship.24  Thus, the revision of chronology 
established in Parts I and II gives more prominence to prison labor as 
integral to wider trends affecting domestic labor markets under 
pressure from global competition.  Acknowledging the wider context 
of prison privatization clarifies the scope and substance of regulation, 
and the potential for improvements through law and law reform, 
including but not limited to issues of contracting.  In Part III, we 
conclude our analysis in these terms and apply our findings regarding 
prison privatization to potential areas of improvement through law.  
Our aim is to contribute to the private prison debate by shifting the 
terms of debate from the financialization of government to the status 
of labor.  Doing so widens the scope for thinking of prisoners not as 
revenue streams, but as beneficiaries of the corrections system and as 
members of communities beyond prison walls, even while 
incarcerated.25  In this regard, Mary Katzenstein suggests that 
“prisons as institutions can serve as a mirror refracting the values and 
politics of a nation.”26  To Katzenstein’s observation, we would only 
add the global context that affects the status of labor, even within the 
walls of U.S. prisons. 
I.  PRISON PRIVATIZATION AS A DOMESTIC FACE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 
Prison privatization refers to a broad array of privatized 
construction, management, services, and inmate programming.  Each 
of these areas is a piece of a much larger picture of the privatization 
of government functions in the United States.  As such, prison 
privatization is part of a broader regulatory phenomenon 
characteristic of globalization.  In this Part, we discuss privatization as 
                                                                                                                 
 24. On citizenship as the “more encompassing” rubric for discussion of prison 
reform (relative to rights claims), see Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, Rights Without 
Citizenship: Activist Politics And Prison Reform In The United States, in ROUTING 
THE OPPOSITION—SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PUBLIC POLICY AND DEMOCRACY 236–37 
(David S. Meyer et al. eds., 2005) (arguing for restoring the franchise to inmates); see 
also Mary Fainsod Katzenstein et al., The Dark Side of American Liberalism, 8 
PERSP. ON POL. 1035, 1039–45 (2010). 
 25. On prison reforms and programs that cross prison walls in this way, see 
Michelle Brown, Of Prisons, Gardens, and the Way Out, 64 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 67, 82–83 (2014); Rebecca Ginsburg, Knowing That We Are Making 
a Difference: A Case For Critical Prison Programming, 64 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 33 (2014); Doran Larson, Introduction, 64 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2014); see also UNICOR, supra note 22, at 9. 
 26. Katzenstein et al., supra note 24, at 1036. 
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a feature of globalization, before returning to issues raised by prison 
privatization. 
For purposes of this Article, we take globalization—a term in wide 
and diffuse usage—to refer to myriad measures aimed at accelerating 
the flow of capital and maximizing competitive opportunities for 
accumulation.27  In this Article, we refer to neoliberal globalization, 
and sometimes to neoliberalization—signaling a now-pervasive 
capitalist culture predicated on disembedding the market from 
government, including maximum marketization of government 
services.28 
                                                                                                                 
 27. For general background on neoliberalization as a “distinctive form of 
globalization” (in Harvey’s phrase), see DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 152–72 (2005).  Harvey defines “neoliberalism” as: 
[A] theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-
being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.  The role of the 
[neoliberal] state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices. 
Id. at 2.  In this Article, our concern with neoliberal globalization is primarily with 
governmental and non-governmental interventions aimed at maximizing access to 
capital markets and trade—acknowledging the asymmetries of power and influence 
that enter into the establishment of global trade conditions and its selective benefits.  
For a classic analysis of globalization in these terms, see generally JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Law, 
Markets and Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-Liberal State, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 801 (2006-2007). 
 28. “There has everywhere been an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in 
political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970s.” HARVEY, supra note 27, at 
2.  With respect to private prisons, Martha Minow writes: “[F]or-profit prisons . . . are 
simply part of a larger pattern . . . .  A sea change is at work . . . .  Private and market-
style mechanisms are increasingly employed to provide what government had taken 
as duties.” MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE 
PUBLIC GOOD 2–3 (2002).  But the pervasiveness of neoliberalism does not imply a 
homogeneity of experience within neoliberalism.  For a critique of “convergence 
narratives” of globalization from African perspectives, see JAMES FERGUSON, 
GLOBAL SHADOWS: AFRICA IN THE NEOLIBERAL WORLD ORDER 28–29 (2006).  For 
Asian perspectives, see generally AIHWA ONG, NEOLIBERALISM AS EXCEPTION: 
MUTATIONS IN CITIZENSHIP AND SOVEREIGNTY (2006).  For a discussion of 
alternatives to neoliberal globalization from diverse critical standpoints situated in 
the global south, see generally LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A 
COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-
Garavito eds., 2005).  The importance of specificity is not limited to national or 
regional experience; it is also relevant in the analysis of domestic policy fields.  For a 
discussion of neoliberalism and welfare administration reform, see Alfred C. Aman, 
Jr., Globalization and the Privatization of Welfare Administration in Indiana, 20 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 377, 377–78 (2013) (discussing Karl Polanyi and various 
ways in which markets can be re-embedded into society). 
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A. The Global Context: Privatization and Neoliberalization 
In the United States, privatization should be understood as both a 
driving and principal effect of globalization.29  The increasing reliance 
on marketized forms of administration and corporate self-regulation 
in lieu of regulation by government is commonly referred to as “the 
new governance.”30  The new governance is indicative of recent 
transformations in the relationship between the market and the state 
itself—transformations that are inseparable from global economic 
competition and other forms of interdependence between state and 
non-state actors, domestically and transnationally, as these have 
developed in recent decades.31 
Neoliberalization of government in the United States puts a 
political premium on the financialization of public administration, 
government services, and other government functions, in turn lending 
                                                                                                                 
 29. “Governing by contract in the United States today should be understood as 
integral to the processes, both political and economic, that made privatization a 
major domestic response to as well as driver of globalization.” Aman, Privatization 
and Democracy, supra note 12, at 261. 
 30. See LESTER M. SALAMON, THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE 
NEW GOVERNANCE vii (2002).  “The new governance” is Salamon’s term for an 
approach to problem solving in the public sphere.  It refers to an analytical 
[F]ramework [emphasizing] the collaborative nature of modern efforts to 
meet human needs, the widespread use of tools of action that engage 
complex networks of public and private actors, and the resulting need for a 
different style of public management, and a different type of public sector, 
emphasizing collaboration and enablement rather than hierarchy and 
control. 
Id. 
 31. On transformations of the public sphere, see Ali Farazmand, Globalization, 
Privatization and the Future of Modern Governance: A Critical Assessment, 2 PUB. 
FIN. MGMT. 151, 152 (2002) (“With sweeping privatization of public enterprises and 
other major governmental functions, the capacity and ability of governments in 
public management are seriously diminished even as challenges and crises multiply in 
both number and intensity.  Globalization has not ended the state and public 
administration, but it has caused a major qualitative change and alteration in the 
nature, character, and role of the state and public management; in fact, state 
continuity persists because it is instrumental to the functioning of capitalism.”).  On 
transformations in private life, see CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, Introduction, in 
ETHNOGRAPHIES OF NEOLIBERALISM 3 (2010) (“In its valorization of the individual, 
its preference for markets over rights as the basis for social reform, and its 
withdrawal of the state from the service sector, neoliberalism overwrites older 
notions of the public based in organic solidarity with a strong mechanical overlay – as 
an improvement, or modernization, of more traditional social bonds.  Understanding 
this inversion is crucial to understanding the nature of the interpretive questions to 
which neoliberalism gives rise in everyday life, since neoliberal reform reshapes the 
relationship between society and the state without eliminating what came before.”).  
For the impact of neoliberalization on the crime policy and practice in recent 
decades, see GARLAND, supra note 19, at 105–06. 
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rhetorical heft to two principal distinctions: between the public and 
private sectors, and, correspondingly, between law and markets as 
regulatory tools.32  The realities of financing government are far more 
complex than these rhetorical distinctions imply.  Whereas the 
rhetoric implies complementarity (more private sector equals less 
government, for example), the diverse complexity of the state’s roles 
in privatization, as well as the variety of businesses and business 
models involved, defy neat boundaries.33  To the extent that 
maximizing the financialization of government through privatization 
entails deregulation or outsourcing, one should keep in mind the fact 
that these tools for minimizing government (as the rhetoric implicitly 
claims) actually extend government into new areas of the private 
sector, through contracts, monitoring, and other means.34  A relevant 
example is prison privatization, which at its inception had already 
involved a complex cooperative arrangement between government 
and business, developed over the course of years.35 
Privatization by contract became politically popular in the United 
States as an approach to the governmental provision of social 
services, especially for the poor, for immigrants, and for prisoners—
i.e., dependent populations whose situations expose them extensively 
                                                                                                                 
 32. On the connections between the politics and rhetoric in the neoliberalization 
of the federal government in the United States, see GREENHOUSE, supra note 16, at 
76, 231.  On the dilemmas of the public/private distinction as related to globalization, 
see SALAMON, supra note 30, at vii.  On the distinction between state law and 
markets as sources of regulation, see COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF 
NEO-LIBERALISM 24–48 (2011); Farazmand, supra note 31, at 152.  Michelman notes 
the binary ideological distinction between these terms among some proponents and 
critics of privatization, in contrast to the pragmatic impossibility of neatly separating 
them as actions or effects. See Michelman, supra note 7, at 1080. 
 33. See Farazmand, supra note 31, at 153; Genders, supra note 4, at 286–87. See 
generally GARLAND, supra note 19. 
 34. On the expansion of the state’s role in relation to the privatization of prisons 
and prison alternatives in the United States, see Malcolm Feeley, Entrepreneurs of 
Punishment: The Legacy of Privatization, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 321, 322–23 (2002).  
For a discussion of how deregulation results in a new form of regulation, see AMAN, 
THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 48–53. 
 35. On the development of cooperation between government and business in the 
prison sector, see DONNA SELMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, PUNISHMENT FOR SALE: 
PRIVATE PRISONS, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE INCARCERATION BINGE 77–104 (2010). 
See also KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS, 100–01 (1997); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE 
ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 233–
39 (2011). See generally DONAHUE, supra note 3; Mona Lynch, Selling 
‘Securityware’: Transformations in Prison Commodities Advertising, 1949–1999, 4 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y, 305 (2002). 
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to managed care of various kinds.36  Such marketization became a sort 
of political common sense as electorates, led by politicians and 
advocacy groups, became aware of global economic competition in 
the 1980s and 1990s.37  Municipal, state, and federal contracts with 
private providers are not new in the United States, but—as in the 
prison context—such contracts were now put to new ends, with the 
government as both contractor and client. 
Federal and state commitments to privatization are integral to the 
neoliberalization of global capital, even when the relevant activities 
are located entirely within the domestic territory of the United 
States.38  Understanding domestic privatization in global terms 
clarifies the scope for law in relation to privatization—though we do 
not suggest that law alone (for example, in the form of legislation or 
contracts) will offer solutions to all the problems that currently 
encumber the systems of corrections in the United States.39  It also 
introduces fresh perspectives on the situation of imprisoned people 
beyond their status as inmates (e.g., as wage earners, family members, 
citizens, and so forth).  Moreover, it highlights a potentially significant 
role for political engagement involving diverse stakeholder 
communities—including inmates’ families and communities.40 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Martin Sellers refers to the public “production” of prisons—distinguishing 
between production (which may be public or private, or both) and provision (which is 
governmental). MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE 
PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 16–17, 33–36 (1993). 
 37. On the relevance of global economic competition to Congressional debates 
over immigration, welfare, and civil rights, see GREENHOUSE, supra note 16, at 74. 
 38. See GARLAND, supra note 19, at 127, 131–32 (discussing privatization and 
globalization as the context for transformations in the penal field in Great Britain 
and the United States). 
 39. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 40. To the extent that the public has been involved in such decisions, the question 
has been framed around taxation and public expense.  Commentators note that state 
and local prison construction has been constrained by voters’ rejections of general 
bond issues. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.  Michael Hallett notes that this 
is not the only means available to governors and local executives for raising revenues 
for new projects such as prison construction; lease-payment bonds are an alternative 
means, not subject to a referendum. See Michael Hallett, Race, Crime, and for Profit 
Imprisonment: Social Disorganization as Market Opportunity, 4 PUNISHMENT & 
SOC’Y, 369, 375–76 (2002) (noting lease-payment bonds are an alternative to public 
bonds, not subject to a referendum, available to governors and local executives for 
raising revenues for new projects such as prison construction).  To our knowledge, 
the public has not been effectively involved in questions on the other side of the coin, 
in particular, questions arising from the fact of profit-making corporations 
performing the day-to-day functions of government.  In the conclusions, we argue for 
broader public engagement on such questions, which vary with the different settings 
in which they arise.  For example, privatizing a prison is very different than entering 
into a contract for the construction and maintenance of buildings, bridges or roads.  
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The advantage of understanding globalization’s “domestic face”—
i.e., its embeddedness in the local—is the light shed on the major roles 
local actors and institutions can potentially play when it comes to 
creating a more humane conception of globalization and its 
practices.41  This in turn draws attention to the role of contracts in the 
privatization process, and their potential for introducing more 
specificity, transparency, and accountability into what is otherwise 
treated as atypical government contracts dealing, for example, with 
bridge or road construction.42  The human emergency that by 
definition accompanies imprisonment makes these issues vivid and 
urgent. 
The idea that globalization and domestic law are interrelated in the 
private prison context may seem counter-intuitive, given that criminal 
law enforcement is traditionally considered a domestic function.  The 
recent history of prison privatization, however, is fascinating precisely 
because it reveals how fundamental questions, such as the significance 
of territoriality, the scope of government, and other such basic 
matters actually are undecided at any given point in time. 
Appreciating privatization as integral to globalization fosters a 
multi-centered approach to reform, open to multiple institutions and 
communities.  As we review policy paths taken and not taken in the 
discussion below, our concern is not to endorse or condemn any 
particular approach, but to highlight the contemporary complexity of 
the question of how government defines its beneficiaries.  Looking 
                                                                                                                 
Thus, distinguishing between what is public, and what is private, is highly contingent 
on the extent to which the interests of government, the private sector, and specific 
political communities (voters and others) align.  We leave this point, for now, as a 
terminological note: throughout, we refer to government and firms—rather than 
public and private producers—to avoid prejudging the extent to which public and 
private values and interests are commensurable in any given situation. 
 41. See Aman, Democracy Deficits in the U.S., supra note 12, at 7; see also 
SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL 
ASSEMBLAGES 1 (2006) (“The epochal transformation we call globalization is taking 
place inside the national to a far larger extent than is usually recognized.  It is here 
that the most complex meanings of the global are being constituted . . . .”). 
 42. For a detailed and critical analysis of the contracting process in the context of 
prison health care, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., An Administrative Law Perspective on 
Government Social Service Contracts: Outsourcing Prison Health Care in New York 
City, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 301, 304 (2007) (“The least-bid government 
contract has its variants, such as those that provide governments some discretion 
when social services are involved.  Such approaches, however, remain focused 
primarily on cost and an open bidding procedure.  They may be appropriate for 
infrastructrue projects such as roads, bridges, or public buildings, or services such as 
building cleaning, copy machine repair, or even food services.  But they take on a 
negatively transformative effect when applied to more fundamental human needs 
such as health.”). 
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ahead in that spirit, one role for law might be in the development of 
infrastructures for reforms—e.g., contributing to the development of 
new forums for deliberation and stakeholder participation in relation 
to decisions not only regarding whether to outsource, but also how 
and with whom.  Another role might be in forging channels across 
policy domains, as a corrective to the politicization of rhetoric, and 
the gap between rhetoric and pragmatic effects, both of which occur 
more easily when contentious issues are left in isolation.  In this 
regard, labor may be seen as a major connection between the prison 
world and the world outside of prisons. 
B. Privatization, Outsourcing, Deregulation, and Globalization: 
A Historical Perspective 
In the United States, privatization usually means some form of 
outsourcing, that is, the contracting out of some or all of an 
administrative agency’s regulatory responsibilities to a private firm.43  
The primary governance tool in privatization is the contract.44  The 
management of prisons has been increasingly outsourced to the 
private sector at both the federal and state levels since its inception in 
the late 1980s and 1990s.45 
Privatization of government by contracting out, or outsourcing, has 
been a trend since the 1980s and through the 1990s—actively 
                                                                                                                 
 43. U.S. privatization has occurred primarily in the form of outsourcing; 
elsewhere—in the United Kingdom and other countries where utilities and other 
services such as transportation are state-owned—privatization has involved the sale 
of government assets.  Mathew Blum proposes a distinction between privatization (as 
sale), out-sourcing (as contract), and competitive sourcing (as a tool that is neutral as 
between privatization and out-sourcing). See Mathew Blum, The Federal Framework 
for Competing Commercial Work between Public and Private Sectors, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 64.  
In the context of this Article, privatization of prisons largely takes the form of 
outsourcing, often with a competitive sourcing rationale. 
 44. Federal contracts with private firms are covered by the Service Contract Act 
of 1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351–58 (2006), and the Procurement Integrity Act, 41 U.S.C. § 
423 (2006).  Specific authority to contract for private prisons has been the subject of 
debate over the years.  In its 1988 report, the President’s Commission on 
Privatization found authority for prison privatization in the Attorney General’s 
discretion regarding the means of detaining prisoners. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON 
PRIVATIZATION, supra note 19, at 147; see 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a) (1988); Pub. L. No. 89-
176, 79 Stat. 674 (1965) (amending § 4082). However, in 1991, and reiterated in 1995, 
the U.S. General Accounting Office felt this authority was insufficient, and 
recommended that Congress give the Bureau of Prisons explicit authority to 
“conduct and evaluate a pilot test of federal prison privatization.” Bureau of Prisons: 
Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 1. 
 45. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 3. 
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promoted by the Reason Foundation,46 and the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations, embraced by the Clinton Administration, and 
accelerated by President George W. Bush’s directive, the President’s 
Management Agenda 2003, mandating all federal agencies to 
privatize administrative services to the maximum extent possible.47  
State legislatures have similarly mandated administrative reviews of 
operations and, in some cases, assets, to assess the potential for 
conversions to private ownership or management.48 The Obama 
Administration has sought to reverse the trend towards offshore 
outsourcing by various means, including significant tax relief for firms 
that relocate to the territorial United States;49 however, privatization 
through outsourcing remains a feature of government operations.  
Privatization is one of the primary mechanisms governments have for 
aligning the financialization of government with neoliberalization of 
the global economy.50  In this section, we explain in broad terms how 
that alignment works. 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See REASON FOUND., ANNUAL PRIVATIZATION REPORT: TRANSFORMING 
GOVERNMENT THROUGH PRIVATIZATION 1–2 (2006), available at http://reason.org/
files/d767317fa4806296191436e95f68082a.pdf.  SourceWatch attributes the Reason 
Foundation’s position on privatization to the influence of George C. Zoley, CEO of 
GEO Group. See George C. Zoley, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/
index.php/George_C._Zoley. 
 47. See FED. ACQUISITION COUNCIL, MANAGER’S GUIDE TO COMPETITIVE 
SOURCING 16–22 (2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/assets/procurement_guides/fac_manager_guide.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMPETITIVE SOURCING: REPORT ON 
THE USE OF BEST VALUE TRADEOFFS IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION 2–5 (2006), 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/procurement/
comp_src/cs_best_value_report_2006.pdf; 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMPETITIVE 
SOURCING: CONDUCTING PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION IN A REASONED AND 
RESPONSIBLE MANNER 1 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/procurement/comp_sourcing_072403.pdf; REASON FOUND., supra note 46, 
at 7, 23; REASON PUB. POLICY INST., PRIVATIZATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON 
CONTRACTING, PRIVATIZATION, AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 1–4 (1997). 
 48. See REASON FOUND., supra note 46, at 55–60; Robert D. Boerner, 
Privatization of State Government Services, NAT’L CONG. ST. LEGISLATURES 
LEGISBRIEFS, Jan. 1998. See generally KIMBERLY BANDY & STEPHEN GRIMES, 
PRIVATE CONTRACTS, PUBLIC SERVICES: WEIGHING THE CHOICES (1995), available at 
http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/Repository/RE/private.pdf. 
 49. See Administration Support For Insourcing and Increasing Investment in the 
United States, WHITE HOUSE http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
1_10_2012_fact_sheet_on_past_support_for_insourcing_final_2.pdf (last visited Aug. 
13, 2014). 
 50. Thus, William Novak relates privatization to larger policy trends, referring to 
the turn to privatization [as] the tendency of policymakers to increasingly 
rely on the private sector, through out-sourcing, contracting, disinvestment, 
and the selling and leasing of governmental properties and resources, to 
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When privatization takes the form of outsourcing, it is also a form 
of deregulation.  Deregulation in the form of outsourcing is one of the 
predominant modes of domestic regulatory reform today, such that 
private firms now provide many services once provided by 
governments.51 Privatization and its close cousin, deregulation, are the 
hallmarks of U.S. regulation, in what author Alfred Aman has called 
the era of globalization.52 
Early signs of the global era were the attempts to substitute 
market-oriented rules for New Deal-like regulatory regimes that 
began as early as the Carter Administration53 and accelerated greatly 
                                                                                                                 
meet obligations formerly thought of as distinctly public.  Part of a larger set 
of neoliberal policy shifts that includes deregulation and an increased 
reliance on market mechanisms, this preference for exploring private over 
public solutions has permeated current policy issues ranging from 
international security and prisons to welfare and public health to highways 
and public parks. 
William Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 23; 
see also Michelman, supra note 7, at 1063 (“‘Privatization’ [refers to] . . . roughly, a 
shift toward provision by nongovernmental organizations of certain classes of goods 
and services, or performance by those organizations of certain classes of functions, 
for the provision or performance of which we’ve been accustomed to relying 
exclusively or mainly on government offices and agencies.”). 
 51. See PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (Sheila B. Kamerman & 
Alfred J. Kahn eds., 2014).  Privatization as it is practiced in the United States can 
sometimes result in a complete form of deregulation, as when Congress deregulated 
the price of oil at the wellhead.  But deregulation can also include outsourcing since 
this approach seeks to substitute private actors and firms for government employees 
and administrative agencies.  For a detailed discussion of deregulation and the ways 
that administrative agencies responded to and shaped the global era of regulation, 
see AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra, note 16, at 47–53; Aman, 
Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, supra 
note 16, at 1153–64. 
 52. See PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 51.  Viewed 
through the lens of the history of regulation in the United States, neoliberalization as 
an approach to globalization may be seen as a successor to earlier eras marked by 
their own iconic regulatory trends—the natural monopoly regulation of the New 
Deal era, and the tragedy of the commons that so absorbed regulators during the 
Environmental Era.  But any such comparisons also highlight key differences.  One 
difference is the role of Congress—much less direct now than it was when the reforms 
of the New Deal and the Environmental Era were put in place.  Both of those eras 
were typified by major legislation passed by Congress, whereas today’s deregulatory 
reforms and their calibrations come primarily through administrative agencies and 
presidential executive orders. See Aman, Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the 
Rise of the Administrative Presidency, supra note 16, at 1108–41 (providing a 
detailed history of these regulatory periods); see also AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra, note 16, at 42–43. 
 53. See AMAN, THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 93; Alfred C. Aman, 
Jr., Deregulation in the United States: Transition to the Promised Land, A New 
Regulatory Paradigm, or Back to the Future?, in THE LIBERALIZATION OF STATE 
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under the Reagan and Bush Administrations in the 1980s.  The nature 
of this process is perhaps best exemplified by the reforms that 
occurred at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) at that 
time.54  Throughout the 1980s, the FCC recalibrated its regulatory 
approaches to replace New Deal regulatory actions with more 
market-oriented rules.  For the most part, courts allowed this, 
recognizing that the broad public interest language of New Deal 
statutes such as the Communications Act of 1934 allowed the agency 
the flexibility to substitute a new conception of what the public’s 
interest required, especially in light of changes in the structure and 
competitive capacity of the industries involved.55 
Environmental regulation reform followed a somewhat similar 
regulatory reform path, as market regulatory approaches gradually 
replaced so-called command and control rules.56  Once again, though 
the statutes involved were not as open-ended as New Deal legislation, 
there was enough interpretive room in many cases to introduce 
market means toward regulatory ends.  There were limits to this 
approach,57 but for the most part agencies themselves did most of the 
deregulating involved.  The New Deal regulation of markets in the 
public interest left as part of its legacy a discourse in which 
deregulation in today’s different economic circumstances is now 
similarly justified by some as if it were a corrective swing of the 
regulatory pendulum.  However, the image of the swinging pendulum 
understates the differences between the Depression era and the 
current economic environment. 
A major difference between those earlier regulatory eras and our 
own is that natural monopolies and the tragedy of the commons 
involved market failures, in which the government sought to protect 
the public’s interest by intervening in particular market sectors.  In 
the global era, the focal point of regulation is not market failure per 
se, but competitiveness on a global scale, resulting in a comprehensive 
                                                                                                                 
MONOPOLIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 267 (Damien Geradin ed., 
2000). 
 54. AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 16, at 53–62. 
 55. There were limits to how far the Supreme Court would go with agency 
deregulation. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 
225 (1994) (concluding that the statutory term “modify” connotes only moderate 
change, not complete deregulation). 
 56. See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 16, at 24–41, 
47. 
 57. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 30 (1983) (holding that the agency could not rescind its rule requiring airbags 
without providing adequate reasons for this decision). 
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transformation of the rationales for government itself.  The 
neoliberalization of government means reformulating the government 
as a market actor suited to competition on a global scale—one 
appropriations budget, one agency, one entitlement at a time (to 
choose just some examples).  Such transformations are responsive to 
political pressures—including strong populist pressures—to maximize 
the circulation of wealth by eliminating, to the extent possible, the 
fixed costs of government.58 
Among the reasons for the popularity of privatized approaches to 
the provision of government services is a basic, often untested, 
assumption that efficiencies will result from competition attainable 
only in the private sector.  We call this “the efficiency story.”  The 
efficiency story rests on three premises: first, that government services 
are characteristically unduly encumbered with unnecessary costs and 
so-called red tape; second, that market competition produces a sort of 
Darwinian effect of favoring the fittest; and third, that competition is 
consistently a feature of private sector markets. 
None of these premises is valid in relation to the prison sector.  
With respect to the relativity of public and private efficiency, a 
popular assumption promoted by the industry is that private prisons 
are more cost-efficient than public prisons.  However, more neutral 
studies, for example, a 2001 report under the auspices of the Bureau 
of Justice Assistance (BJA),59 indicate that the cost differential 
between private and public prisons is minimal.60  With regard to 
market competition: the prison market consists of few private sector 
providers and only very limited competition (in prison privatization, 
two main firms among approximately a score of others).61  These 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing post-Fordist capitalism); 
see also Alfred C. Aman, The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on 
the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 769, 787 (1998). 
 59. The BJA, a federal agency charged with monitoring prisons and other aspects 
of the U.S. justice system, was established by the Justice Assistance Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-473, §§ 401–08, 98 Stat. 1837, 2080–85. 
 60. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at iii, 59 (comparing industry 
“proponents” claims to twenty percent savings over public prisons, with a BJA study 
showing savings closer to one percent, largely due to lower labor costs, and indicating 
other potential gains with respect to private prisons, especially the relatively greater 
openness of private prison administrators to positive reforms).  Overall, studies 
comparing the relative cost efficiency of public and private prisons are not conclusive, 
even to some advocates of privatization. See Geoffrey Segal, Comparing the 
Performance of Private and Public Prisons, REASON FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2008), 
http://www.reason.org/news/show/comparing-the-performance-of-p.html. 
 61. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 4.  For the entrepreneurial history of 
the major corporations involved in international, federal, state, and local 
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providers are a subset of the larger and more rapidly growing private 
security industry.62  With regard to competition: the major public-
private partnerships in the corrections field have long histories of 
multi-sided relationships.  But competitiveness is not a fixed notion, 
nor is it automatically limited to strictly economic issues. 
Privatization advocates have framed their appeals largely in terms 
of benefits to national, state, and local economies, while remaining 
relatively silent on the global context that today defines the very 
terms of economic competitiveness.  The purpose of this subsection 
has been to highlight the extent to which a global context is subsumed 
within the idea of competitiveness itself. 
C. Private Prisons and the Myth of Efficiency 
Let us now return to prison privatization, in light of the 
observations in the previous sections.  The discussion so far suggests 
that outsourcing in the United States occupies a dynamic political 
space brought about by the diversity of ways in which government is 
today positioned in relation to private enterprise on a global scale.  
There is a vein of contradiction that runs through this space.  On the 
one hand, core governmental functions impose obligations on 
government budgets.  On the other hand, governments are also held 
to account—administratively and by electorates—to minimizing those 
budgets and, directly or indirectly, the functions they support.  Seen 
in this light, privatization in the form of outsourcing is, in effect, a 
structural compromise—maintaining governmental functions while 
performing them through the private sector. 
Including prison privatization within the ambit of privatization 
overall was critical to the privatization movement’s strategists, for 
whom “the ideological stakes in the debate over correctional 
contracting [were] high.”63  For at least some critics, the sticking point 
was not privatization per se, but, more concretely, the risk of 
introducing new vested interests into the criminal justice system.64  
                                                                                                                 
privatization in the corrections sector, see The CCA Story: Our Company History, 
CCA, http://www.cca.com/our-history (last visited June 23, 2014); The Wackenhut 
Corporation History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/
company-histories/the-wackenhut-corporation-history/ (last visited June 23, 2014); 
see also discussion infra Part II. 
 62. See DONAHUE, supra note 3, on the relative weakness of the private prison 
market. 
 63. LOGAN, supra note 5, at 5. 
 64. See Michael Janus, Bars on the Iron Triangle: Public Policy Issues in the 
Privatization of Prisons, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 86 (Gary W. 
Bowman et al. eds., 1993); see also  SELMAN & LEIGHTON, supra note 35, at 77–104 
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For others, with the privatization of prisons apparently now “here to 
stay,”65 the concern is the emergence of a new bureaucratic form—
only ambiguously accountable to the public—at the conjuncture of 
government and business, broadening the scope of the state into ever-
expanding areas of the private sector.66  These contradictions and the 
complex environment within which private prisons function require 
that we revisit the rationales for prison privatization. 
1. Revisiting the Rationales for Privatizing Prisons 
Prison privatization emerged as a subject of debate among 
academics, advocates, and policy makers in the late 1980s—a time 
when prisons were dramatically overcrowded, with pressures building 
in favor of experimentation with new forms of funding to 
accommodate the radical increase in demand for prison space.  In his 
classic account, David Garland analyzes this period as marked by a 
dramatic and comprehensive shift in crime policy and public attitudes 
on both sides of the Atlantic—abandoning older ideas of 
rehabilitation in favor of punishment.67 
                                                                                                                 
(detailing a range of vested interests in a variety of prison contracts, including the 
real estate investment trust arrangements of the main private corrections firms 
(guaranteeing tax relief to the firms and a large return on profits to shareholders), 
and the IPO offerings of all the U.S. corrections firms that sell shares on the stock 
exchange)). 
 65. See Alexander Volokh, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality and 
Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1868 (2002).  On 
privatization as a durable element of corrections, see Feeley, supra note 34, at 339–
40. 
 66. Sarah Armstrong calls it “entrepreneurial bureaucracy.”  Sarah Armstrong, 
Punishing Not-For-Profit: Implications of Nonprofit Privatization in Juvenile 
Punishment, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 345, 347 (2002).  For Shichor and Gilbert, the 
relevant term is “subgovernment.” See David Shichor & Michael J. Gilbert, 
Introduction to PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, 
supra note 2.  On the extension of the state into the entrepreneurial sector through 
prison privatization and alternatives to incarceration, see Feeley, supra note 34, at 
322. 
 67. For an analysis of mass incarceration in the context of transnational neoliberal 
capitalism, see David Downes, The Macho Penal Economy: Mass Incarceration in the 
United States—a European Perspective, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES 51, 51–65 (David Garland ed., 2001). See generally NILS 
CHRISTIE, CRIME CONTROL AS INDUSTRY: TOWARD GULAGS, WESTERN STYLE (3d 
ed. 2000); GARLAND, supra at note 19; THOMAS MATHIESEN, PRISON ON TRIAL 
(1990); JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF 
THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 (1993) [hereinafter SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE]; Malcolm 
M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of 
Corrections and its Implication, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992); Jonathan Simon, Rise 
of the Carceral State, 74 SOC. RES. 471 (2007) [hereinafter Simon, Rise of the 
Carceral State].  On mass incarceration in the United States, see generally Natasha 
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Discussion of prison privatization usually begins with the 
convergence of three developments: a burgeoning prison population, 
economic pressures on government coffers, and the mood of the 
electorate (e.g., pressing for more effective prosecution of street 
crime and longer sentences, and resistance to adding to tax burdens 
with construction of new facilities for inmates).  This is a standard 
narrative well established in academic and policy literatures.  In this 
context, it is worth emphasizing that the explosion of population 
growth in jails and prisons was not due to a general rise in criminal 
activity.  Rather, it was due to specific policy shifts that expanded 
criminalization, particularly of drug offenses, and approaches to 
punishment embodied by so-called three-strikes laws.  The legislative 
sources are the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (which 
created the U.S. Sentencing Commission, whose guidelines went into 
effect on November 1, 1987) and the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1984 
and 1987.68  These Acts resulted in new convictions, longer sentences 
and reduced availability of parole—filling prisons well beyond their 
designed capacity.69 
The spike in federal incarceration in the decade between the late 
1980s and the late 1990s is generally ascribed to the increase in 
convictions of non-violent drug offenders under the 1984 and 1988 
legislation cited above.  By the end of 1997, sixty-eight percent of all 
minimum-security federal prisoners were non-violent drug 
                                                                                                                 
A. Frost & Todd R. Clear, Understanding Mass Incarceration as a Grand Social 
Experiment, 47 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 159 (2009); Michelle S. 
Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in 
U.S. Prison Programs, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 33 (2011).  Austin and Coventry suggest 
that given the intensity of contemporary cost-efficiency pressures, there is “little 
need” for industry promoters to make claims regarding their rehabilitative capacity. 
See AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 13.  On mass incarceration in the United 
Kingdom, see generally GARLAND, supra note 19; Genders, supra note 4. 
 68. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1976; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.  The 
periodization of the dramatic rise in the inmate population to the effects of this 
legislation is well established by the separate studies of mass incarceration. See Gary 
W. Bowman et al., Introduction to PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 64, at 1–2; see also Hallett, supra note 40, at 371. See generally GARLAND, supra 
note 19; Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20; SIMON, POOR 
DISCIPLINE, supra note 67. 
 69. See Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 1.  Meanwhile, 
Congress continued to hold hearings on prison crowding, considering 
recommendations for reducing incarcerations by promoting alternatives to prison, 
such as electronic supervision, split sentences, half-way houses, and privatization. 
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offenders.70  At the state level, forty-four percent of the increase in 
the prison population between 1986 and 1991 was due to the rise in 
non-violent drug offense incarcerations.71  In South Carolina 
correctional facilities alone, between 1989 and 1993, there was a 
thirty-three percent increase in inmates.72  By 2001, a Department of 
Justice report estimated that some two million inmates were 
incarcerated in the United States.73 
Pressure against capacity became a persuasive rationale for 
privatization, at least among policy makers.  The policy scenario 
includes expanding accommodations for inmates with minimal 
investment on the part of government, by virtue of the government’s 
participation in corrections as a client rather than as provider.  One 
way to build new prisons without raising taxes is to outsource their 
construction and management to private firms.  Private firms pay the 
upfront construction costs and amortize them over a number of years.  
In this way, new prisons can be built without significantly affecting 
state taxes or budgets, although, as Hallett points out, taxpayers are 
involved eventually in all state expenditures.74 
Since at least the 1970s—well prior to the crowding crisis of the late 
1980s—federal capacity shortages were chronic in an episodic way, 
resulting in periodic demands for Congressional appropriations for 
Bureau of Prisons budgets and authorizations for new construction.  
In 1975, for example, Congressional hearings on the shortage of 
federal capacity considered a recommendation to transfer all federal 
prisoner administration to the states—along with other 
recommendations (some of them still under consideration today) 
regarding alternatives to incarceration.75  Congressional moratoria on 
new prison construction and reductions in block grants to states 
strained the Federal Bureau of Prisons and state agencies prior to the 
                                                                                                                 
 70. JOANNE O’BRYANT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB92061, PRISONS: POLICY 
OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 7 (2000), available at http://research.policyarchive.org/
835.pdf. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See GEORGE SEXTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WORK IN AMERICAN PRISONS: 
JOINT VENTURES WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR 5 (1995), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/workampr.pdf. 
 73. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at iii. 
 74. See Hallett, supra note 40, at 376. 
 75. Federal Bureau of Prisons Institutions Prison: Construction Plans and Policy: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Administration of 
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 383 (1975), 
available at http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-
1975-hjh-0027?accountid=13314 (login required). 
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dramatic spike in the inmate population that has been well-noted for 
the later 1980s and subsequently.76 
But one should not assume that prison privatization originated as 
an initiative within the government; it was an idea that circulated 
between actors in government and business firms long before the first 
private prisons were authorized.  The development of the market for 
private prison services and management was complex over at least a 
decade prior to the initiatives that resulted in the full privatization of 
prisons—multi-faceted collaborations between federal, state, and 
local governments, and the private sector: businesses developing their 
competitive capacity and promoting their services while governments 
(in effect) warranted their investment by delivering legislation that 
allows for contracts in those service sectors.77  A governmental 
Request for Proposals (RFP), which solicits bids for a contract, is in 
this sense the culmination of a collaboration, not the beginning of 
one.  Successful bids on contracts are, in turn, warrants (in effect) of 
the value of shareholder investment through public offerings.  The 
U.S. corrections field came into view as an untapped market from 
within the fast-paced development of the private security industry in 
the 1980s,78 and after other countries began to contract for security 
and corrections facilities with U.S. corporations.79  It is not surprising 
that “the market” may consist of very few firms.  Within the United 
States, the vast majority of prison privatization contracts have been 
awarded to just two firms: Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA) and The GEO Group (GEO) (formerly Wackenhut 
                                                                                                                 
 76. The importance of Congressional attempts to discipline the Bureau of Prisons 
with funding limits and bans on new construction in the 1970s is two-fold: one, to 
highlight the relevance of states as resources available to the federal government to 
address deficiencies at the federal level, and two, to underscore the extent to which 
the public’s later reluctance to fund new prison construction with bond issues 
followed Congressional action. See infra notes 99–107.  On reductions of block grants 
to states, see SELLERS, supra note 36, at 14–16, tbl.1.3. 
 77. See SELLERS, supra note 36; see also SELMAN & LEIGHTON, supra note 35, at 
89–90, 101. 
 78. See BECKETT supra note 35, at 101.  For a state-level case study of the 
complexities of private interests in law and order, see Michael C. Campbell, Politics, 
Prisons, and Law Enforcement: An Examination of the Emergence of “Law and 
Order” Politics in Texas, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (2011). 
 79. GEO’s website gives prominence to its contracts elsewhere in the English-
speaking world—South Africa, Australia, and the United Kingdom.  Indeed, GEO 
had extensive international clients prior to the expansion of its corrections sector in 
the United States. See Historic Milestones, GEO GROUP, INC., 
http://www.geogroup.com/history/ (last visited June 23, 2014); see also The 
Wackenhut Corporation History, supra note 61. 
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Corrections Corporation).80  These are large corporations that build 
and operate private prisons, among other services and products that 
pre-dated the emergence of opportunities for private prison 
construction and management.81 
2. The Chronology of Prison Privatization 
The efficiency story usually associated with discussions of prison 
privatization has two elements—inmate crowding and cost control.  
However, as indicated in the previous section, it is not at all clear that 
prison privatization—at its inception—followed the dramatic increase 
in prosecutions in the late 1980s that led to higher rates of conviction 
and incarceration, and prison crowding.  A more agnostic view of the 
crowding crisis would acknowledge that prison crowding was the 
result of federal policies, not, initially, their justification.  Indeed, the 
rationales for prison privatization were developed—in think tanks, 
boardrooms, and private offices—at least a decade before the current 
overcrowding crisis became evident in the late 1980s and 1990s.  
Support for prison privatization among politicians and policy makers 
emerged earlier than—and independently of—the carceral explosion 
and voter resistance to bond issues, even if it later became 
inseparable from those developments.82 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 4, tbl.3.  For the entrepreneurial 
history of one major corporation involved in international, federal, state, and local 
privatization in the corrections sector, see The Wackenhut Corporation History, 
supra note 61. 
 81. GEO was founded in 1984, Historic Milestones, supra note 79, and now runs 
106 facilities around the world, claiming a cost savings of thirty percent over the 
public sector. Welcome to the GEO Group, Inc., GEO GROUP, 
http://www.geogroup.com/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).  Its first federal partnership 
was with ICE in 1987, in connection with the Aurora ICE Processing Center. Historic 
Milestones, supra note 79.  Its first federal contract to build and run an entire prison 
involved the demonstration project discussed below, at the Taft Correctional 
Institution, in California. See id.  CCA has been a long-time participant in public-
private sector dialogues over prison privatization (including Congressional hearings 
and the President’s Commission on Privatization, cited below).  GEO’s CEO, George 
C. Zoley, has been active in promoting prison privatization to government since the 
early to mid-1980s. See id. 
 82. The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ 1990 budget submission called for doubling 
prison capacity by 1995.  The federal inmate population increased by fifty percent 
between 2000 and 2012—more than double the Bureau of Prisons’ targeted rate for 
reducing crowding. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-12-743, BUREAU OF 
PRISONS: GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, STAFF AND 
INFRASTRUCTURES 1 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648123.pdf.  
On the disconnections between political decision-making and the problems affecting 
the prison system, see Janus, supra note 64, at 86. 
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At this same time, just ahead of the prison crowding crisis, crime 
and fear of crime became political issues as successive Republican 
Party platforms claimed policy credit for declines in the crime rate in 
1984 and 1988, as the Reagan and Bush Administrations expanded 
the scope of criminalization.83  The strategic gambit of controlling 
crime while controlling budgets continued throughout the 1990s.  The 
Republican Party’s platform in 1992 promoted privatization under the 
rubric of “managing government in the public interest”; it also noted 
President Bush’s freeze on regulation, new taxes, and commitment to 
balancing the budget.84  The pledge to expand privatization continued 
in the Republican Party’s platform in 1996, under the rubric of 
“streamlining government.”85  But streamlining government, in 
practice, primarily took the form of reductions of federal grants to 
states.86 
The practice of setting budget restrictions and imposing moratoria 
on new construction were consistent with strategies outlined by the 
GAO as likely to “encourage” agency managers to take privatization 
seriously: 
Governments may need to enact legislative changes and/or reduce 
resources available to government agencies in order to encourage 
greater use of privatization.  Georgia, for example, enacted 
legislation to reform the state’s civil service and to reduce the 
operating funds of state agencies.  Virginia reduced the size of the 
state’s workforce and enacted legislation to establish an independent 
state council to foster privatization efforts.  These actions, officials 
                                                                                                                 
 83. The Republican platforms mentioned declines in the crime rate in both years. 
See Republican Party Platform of 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 20, 1984), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25845 (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); Republican 
Party Platform of 1988, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 16, 1988), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25846 (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). 
 84. See Republican Party Platform of 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 17, 
1992), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25847 (last visited June 22, 2014). 
 85. See Republican Party Platform of 1996, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 12, 
1996), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848 (last visited Nov. 10, 
2014).  Earlier Republican platforms did not mention privatization.  In 1996, the 
director of the Bureau of Prisons, Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, supported privatization in 
her budget request on the grounds that it would be a means of complying with the 
Federal Workforce Restructuring Act, without reducing prison capacity.  For 
information on Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, see Historical Information, FED. BUREAU 
PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/history/past_directors.jsp (last visited Nov. 10, 
2014).  Her successor, Harley G. Lappin (Director of the Bureau of Prisons from 
2003 to 2011), left the government to take a position as Executive Vice-President and 
Chief Corrections Officer at CCA.  On Lappin’s move to the private sector, see PA 
Prison Report, HUM. RTS. COALITION, (June 13, 2011), http://www.hrcoalition.org/
node/144.
  
 86. See SELLERS, supra note 36, at 14–15. 
382 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
told us, sent a signal to managers and employees that political 
leaders were serious about implementing privatization.87 
Even with this surge of political interest in crime, prisons filling 
beyond capacity, and campaigns to promote privatization within the 
government, uptake of the private prison option was apparently slow 
to take hold.  A brief on prisons by the Congressional Research 
Service in 2000 indicates that the idea of contracting private 
management for the entirety of a prison’s operations was new and 
“controversial.”88  GAO reports at the time indicated that a key 
concern was a perceived lack of clear statutory authority for 
outsourcing; fear of walkouts and strikes on the part of private sector 
prison staff were among the concerns raised by critics.89  In the United 
States today, roughly ten percent of all prison and jail inmates are 
housed in privatized facilities—approximately 200,000 individuals.90  
Approximately ten percent of federal inmates are housed in private 
facilities.91  By 2001, there were 158 private prison facilities in the 
United States.92  Most states have at least one private prison, with the 
largest numbers of privatized facilities in California, Florida, and 
Texas.93  Privatized detention facilities have also developed for the 
detention of juveniles and unregistered immigration.94 
Some states were ahead of the federal government in their 
experiments with privatization, encouraged in part by President 
Bush’s authorization to states and local governments receiving federal 
                                                                                                                 
 87. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-87, PRIVATIZATION: 
QUESTIONS STATE AND LOCAL DECISIONMAKERS USED WHEN CONSIDERING 
PRIVATIZATION OPTIONS 12 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/200/
198870.pdf.
  
 88. See O’BRYANT, supra note 70, at 8.
  
 89. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-158, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
PRISONS: STUDIES COMPARING OPERATIONAL COSTS AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE: 
REPORT TO THE SUBCOMM. ON CRIME, COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY 1 (1996), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf. 
 90. On total prison and jail population, see Prison Privatization, supra note 19.  
On federal prison population, see Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, 
at 6.
  
 91. See Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 6–7.
  
 92. See AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at iii.  The same report indicates that 
3100 inmates were housed in private prisons worldwide in 1987, and 132,000 
worldwide in 1998. Id.
  
 93. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 89, at 40 tbl.IV.1.  For 
analyses of citing decisions suggest the complexity of such processes, see generally 
Mona Lynch, Punishment, Purpose, and Place: A Case Study of Arizona’s Prison 
Siting Decisions, 50 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 105 (2009).
  
 94. See Prison Privatization, supra note 19.
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aid to privatize.95  By 1996, the GAO reported that “some states [had] 
contracted with private corporations for prison operations.”96  The 
fiscal year 1996 budget of the Federal Bureau of Prisons expanded its 
request for appropriations in this area.97  Finally, in 1997, GEO was 
awarded a five-year demonstration project to build and manage a 
private prison in Taft, California, bringing to fruition a long 
campaign, involving multiple parties within the federal government 
and in the private sector, in support of experimentally expanding the 
role of the private sector in corrections.98 
In sum, several policy and political developments converged to 
create the conditions that yielded prison privatization: a broad-based 
policy search for alternatives to incarceration;99 constraints on supply 
in the form of court-ordered ceilings on prison population in states;100 
failed bond issues for prison construction in states and 
municipalities;101 fluctuating appropriations to federal and state 
agencies;102 congressional caps on the federal budget and restrictions 
on new prison construction;103 rising demand resulting from 
Congressional legislation mandating new areas of federal prosecution 
and specific sentencing guidelines;104 and a Congressional mandate 
that shifted all D.C. prisoners into the federal system.105  Prison 
privatization became a new area of venture capital106 as privatization 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See Republican Party Platform of 1992, supra note 84. 
 96. O’BRYANT, supra note 70, at 1. 
 97. See id at 6. 
 98. See id.
  
 99. See id. at 1, 7. 
 100. See TODD R. CLEAR ET AL., AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 474 (10th ed. 2013) 
(discussing court-ordered ceilings). 
 101. See Prison Privatization, supra note 19. 
 102. O’BRYANT, supra note 70, at 2. 
 103. See JAMES, supra note 13, at 30 (“[R]ecent reductions in funding for the New 
Construction decision unit . . . mean that the BOP will lack the funding to begin any 
new prison construction in the near future, which could result in increased 
overcrowding in the federal prison system if the federal prison population does not 
continue to decrease . . . .”). 
 104. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONRGRESS: 
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(1991), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-
testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf. 
 105. See Inmate Legal Matters, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/
inmates/custody_and_care/legal_matters.jsp (“The National Capital Revitalization 
and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 transferred responsibility of District 
of Columbia Code felony offenders to the BOP.”). 
 106. See The Prison Boom Produces Privatization, CORRECTIONS PROJECT, 
http://www.correctionsproject.com/corrections/pris_priv.htm (last visited June 17, 
2014). 
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more broadly took hold as a philosophical/political commitment107—
both developments taking place prior to the crowding of prisons and 
funding and resource shortages that are the more usual start to 
narratives on this subject.  An appropriate chronology is key to 
understanding the context of prison privatization in relation to 
neoliberal globalization, and its current stakes in human terms. 
To conclude Part I, we suggest that while there is obvious 
relevance to the fact of prison crowding and the reality of taxpayer 
resistance to funding expansions of government obligations, one must 
consider the possibility that the loss of political support for funding 
the government and the popularity of marketization were the result 
of the neoliberal policies rather than its driving cause.  In our view, 
explaining the origins of prison privatization in the situation of 
underfunding and overcrowding risks mistakes effects as causes. 
By 1988, the push to privatize prisons, in one form or another, 
involved every branch of government at the highest levels, revealing 
significant tensions between them, as well as between and within the 
two main political parties.  It is crucial to appreciate the differences 
                                                                                                                 
 107. The first two wholly private prisons under contract to the federal government 
were in Leavenworth, Kansas.  On Leavenworth, see J. Duncan Moore, Federal 
Prison To Be Built, Run By Private Firms, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18, 1990, at A10.  
Leavenworth is a project of the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA).  CCA 
specializes in maximum security, and is the fifth largest corrections system in the 
United States (after its competitor, GEO, and three states).  It manages sixty-one 
facilities nationwide. See See CCA’s Nationwide System of Correctional Centers, 
CCA, https://www.cca.com/locations (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).  In 1990, the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons was Michael Quinlan (director 1987–1992), whose 
previous professional experience included service as executive assistant to the warden 
at Leavenworth Penitentiary. See J. Michael Quinlan, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/about/history/past_directors.jsp (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).  
Leavenworth is currently under contract to the U.S. Marshalls Service. See U.S. Facts 
Sheet, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, http://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/
general-1209.html (last visited June 22, 2014).  Taft Correctional Institution was 
established by Congress in 1997, as a five-year federal demonstration project, under 
contract with GEO. See Historic Milestones, supra note 79.  A demonstration project 
of this kind was a longstanding recommendation of the GAO. See U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA)/GGD-91-21, PRIVATE PRISONS: COST SAVINGS AND 
BOP’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY NEED TO BE RESOLVED 4–5 (1991), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150187.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/GGD-90-1BR, PRISON CROWDING: ISSUES FACING THE NATION’S PRISON 
SYSTEMS 19 (1989), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/80/77582.pdf; see also U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 82, at 5.  The project evaluation was 
contracted to a private consulting firm, Abt Associates. See DOUGLAS C. 
MCDONALD & KENNETH CARLSON, ABT ASSOCS., INC., CONTRACTING FOR 
IMPRISONMENT IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: COST AND PERFORMANCE OF THE 
PRIVATELY OPERATED TAFT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION v (2005), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211990.pdf. 
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between the visions and values that guided these efforts; this is the 
theme of Part II. 
II.  PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND PRISON LABOR 
The previous discussion argues for lengthening the chronology of 
prison privatization so as to include the privatization movement in 
history in an integral way.  Doing so adds at least a decade to the 
story.  It also broadens and enriches the context around prison 
privatization, to include more of the complex social, legal, and 
political tectonics of the period.  Prisons were at the crux of the 
contradictory crosscurrents discussed above, as demand for stronger 
measures against offenders (and corresponding demand for new 
prisons) was at odds with the simultaneous demand for leaner 
government and brakes on public expenditure.  Whatever the appeal 
of privatization as a structural compromise in theory, the substantive 
consequences were dramatic as a practical matter.  Rates of 
imprisonment soared even as crime rates declined.108  Concerned by 
the unprecedented levels of incarceration that heavily disfavored 
young black men, some socio-legal scholars saw the situation as a 
fundamental transformation of state and society—as prisons filled 
with young men who had been displaced from the labor force in a 
new climate in which economic risk was displaced onto workers, for 
whom persistent under- and unemployment became the norm.109  
However, crime policies turned away from rehabilitation, and 
increasingly toward confinement and punishment.110  As David 
                                                                                                                 
 108. On privatization as part of the context for mass imprisonment, see GARLAND, 
supra note 19, at 131–35.  The phrase “mass imprisonment”—now in general usage—
was Garland’s coinage.  In Garland’s analysis, mass imprisonment—“the systematic 
imprisonment of whole groups” (in the United States, young black men)—was the 
“overdetermined outcome of a converging series of policies and decisions” that 
included prison privatization and “Reaganomics.” David Garland, Introduction: The 
Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 67, at 2 [hereinafter Garland, Introduction]. 
 109. On the need for attention to the restructuring of the economy, see McLennan, 
The New Penal State, supra note 23, at 407, 415.  On income inequality, see generally 
Martina Morris & Bruce Western, Inequality in Earnings at the Close of the 
Twentieth Century, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 623 (1999).  On globalization, see generally 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Globalisation and U.S. Prison Growth: From Military 
Keynesianism to post-Keynesian Militarism, 40 RACE & CLASS 171 (1998/1999). 
 110. Major analyses are now classics in socio-legal studies.  In addition to 
GARLAND, supra note 19 and MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 67. See generally CHRISTIE, supra note 67; MATHIESEN, 
supra note 67; SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, supra note 67; Feeley & Simon, supra note 
67; Simon, Rise of the Carceral State, supra note 67.  On privatization and welfare 
policy, see Downes, supra note 67, 61–63; see also JONATHAN SIMON, MASS 
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Garland observes, incarceration was no longer a matter of reforming 
individual offenders, but of newly normal selective effects that made 
prison “a shaping institution for whole sectors of the population.”111 
These were major changes; however, from the vantage points 
afforded by the longer timeframe we propose for prison privatization, 
the budget constraints and prison overcrowding subsequent to the 
late 1980’s may be seen as relatively late developments.  The prison 
crisis may account for the conditions that made prison privatization 
(like privatization more generally) politically saleable, but the 
context, the idea, its rationales and strategies for implementation, and 
even the firms themselves were already explicitly circulating by that 
time.  In this Part, we look to that earlier period—to two earlier 
prison reform initiatives that are part of the longer history that made 
privatization integral to the globalization of capital.  Both initiatives 
involve prison labor.  Their similarities and differences are relevant to 
an analysis of privatization as entailing diverse means and ends, as 
well as diverse political locations within and beyond government. 
These initiatives were Federal Prison Industries, now known as 
“UNICOR,” and Prison Industry Enhancement, or PIE.  UNICOR is 
a government owned corporation that manages inmate production of 
goods and services available for sale to the government and, under 
some circumstances, on the open market.112  In its current incarnation, 
UNICOR is a form of outsourcing in the sense that it draws on labor 
segregated from the domestic labor force by a state border (i.e., 
prison walls) that demarcates a legal differential of wages and hours, 
among other things.113  UNICOR is not a private enterprise, but it has 
been increasingly pressed to “act” like a private sector firm since its 
re-establishment by Congress as a self-supporting agency in 1988, and 
                                                                                                                 
INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF 
PRISONS IN AMERICA 73–108 (2014). 
 111. Garland, Introduction, supra note 108, at 1. 
 112.  UNICOR, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_
and_care/unicor.jsp. 
 113.  See Stephanie Overby, Prison Labor: Outsourcing’s “Best Kept Secret,” 
CIO.COM (May 27, 2010), http://www.cio.com/article/2417888/outsourcing/prison-
labor--outsourcing-s--best-kept-secret-.html (“Since 1999, private corporations in the 
U.S. have outsourced a variety of business services to federal prison inmates, who 
today earn around $1 an hour for call center work.  Proponents of the practice claim 
prison labor is a low-cost alternative to offshore outsourcing, but critics say it takes 
jobs away from law-abiding U.S. citizens.”). 
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on-going pressures in the direction of increased competition and 
absorption of financial risk.114 
By contrast, PIE brings private firms into prisons, giving private 
sector employers access to inmates as a work force.115  UNICOR 
produces goods and services for an essentially governmentally-
guaranteed market (as we shall see); PIE relies on the open market.116  
Together, consideration of these programs (discussed separately in 
the following sections) lends fresh prominence to the role of labor in 
relation to privatization in the prison context.  Once the integral 
relation of prison labor and global capital is appreciated, prison 
privatization and the new pressures on labor to absorb the risk in 
economic fluctuations may be understood in turn as related 
developments.  By attending to the government’s diverse efforts to 
position prison labor in relation to privatization, the connections 
between globalization, privatization, and prisons are themselves 
clarified—in turn clarifying the context of prison reform as entailing 
issues beyond prisons, particularly in relation to the vulnerability of 
the labor force to fluctuating market conditions. 
A. Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) 
PIE is a key development in prison privatization that dates from 
the 1970s, ultimately taking the form of the Prison Industry 
Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) in 1979.  PIECP is a 
federal program set up under the Justice System Improvement Act of 
1979117—legislation sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), 
with co-sponsors from both sides of the aisle.118  The Act set up the 
main federal agencies charged with research and evaluation of 
criminal justice programs, including corrections: the National Institute 
of Justice, the National Criminal Justice Research Center, the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration, and the Bureau of Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 114.  Cf. Nate C. Hindman, Unicor Under Fire for Dominating Small Competitors 
with Cheap Prison Labor, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2012, 12:48 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/15/unicor-prison-labor_n_1778765.html. 
 115.  See DOMINGO S. HERRAIZ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PROGRAM 
BRIEF: PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (2004), available 
at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/203483.pdf. 
 116.  See id. at 3 (describing program criteria, including “[a]uthority to involve the 
private sector in the production and sale of inmate-made goods on the open 
market”). 
 117. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub.L. 96–157, 93 Stat. 1167 (1979). 
 118. The bill was co-sponsored by Republican Robert McClory of Illinois. H.R. 
2061 (96th): Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/96/hr2061  (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
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Statistics.119  The final section of the Act set up the PIECP, a program 
designed to give authorization, on a limited and prescribed basis, to 
state and local corrections agencies to contract with private sector 
firms for purposes of running those firms’ operations within prisons.120 
Subsequently expanded to offer broader participation, eligibility 
for enhanced prison industry certification entails specific conditions.  
In particular, if prison-made goods are to be sold on the open market, 
wages must be on a par with other local producers, and there must be 
no displacement of local workers.121  These restrictions have tended to 
reinforce niche production, i.e., in sectors where there is no local 
competition.  Partners must further demonstrate that their venture 
will not impair existing contracts.122  Labor unions must be informed 
and consulted.123  Once certification is complete, the PIE model 
involves two main features.  First, it brings a private sector enterprise 
fully within the prison walls, to be run on standard business principles, 
for profit.124  Second, prisoners are employees of the company, 
earning wages that are subject to various forms of withholding (FICA, 
Medicaid, taxes, child support, and required personal savings for the 
inmate’s use, post-release).125  There are a variety of employment 
models; some inmates work directly for the company, while others are 
employed by prison management and assigned to the company.  
States write their own guidelines for enhanced prison industry 
programs.126 
                                                                                                                 
 119. About the Bureau of Justice Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=abu (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
 120. Individual enhanced prison industry programs set up under PIECP are known 
by the nickname “PIE”—for Prison Industry Enhancement.  Description of the Act, 
PIECP, and individual PIEs is based on the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, 
Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167.  The best and most comprehensive analysis of 
PIECP, and a detailed assessment of South Carolina’s experience with PIE, is an 
unpublished doctoral dissertation by Marie Fajardo Ragghianti. Marie Fajardo 
Ragghianti, Prison Industries in South Carolina: 1996-2005, Why and How the PIE 
Model Prospered 128–232 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/8178/1/umi-umd-5360.pdf; see also SEXTON, 
supra note 72. 
 121.  See Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 187. 
 122.  Id.   
 123.  Id. at 46. 
 124.  See HERRAIZ, supra note 115, at 3 (“The program provides a stable and 
readily available workforce.  In addition, many correctional agencies provide 
manufacturing space to private-sector companies involved in the program.”). 
 125.  See id. (“Corrections departments may opt to take deductions from inmate 
worker wages. Permissible deductions are limited to taxes, room and board, family 
support, and victims’ compensation.”). 
 126. Ragghianti ascribes some of South Carolina’s success to the Division of 
Corrections Industries director’s inclusion of organized labor in a revision of the state 
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Uptake of PIE has been selective—perhaps an indication of the 
particularity of the circumstances favoring such joint ventures.127  The 
most successful PIEs in terms of private sector response and 
profitability of their enterprises are in South Carolina, Kansas, and 
Texas.128  South Carolina’s program has been the largest and most 
successful program from the outset in the vanguard of recruiting 
private sector ventures and developing successful partnerships with 
firms.129  In South Carolina, the Division of Corrections Industries’ 
private sector partners include Fortune 500 companies such as Escod 
Industries (a cable manufacturing firm whose clients include IBM), as 
well as commercial enterprises that include Third Generation (a 
luxury lingerie manufacturer for retailers such as Victoria’s Secret 
and J.C. Penney) and Jostens, Inc. (the nation’s largest manufacturer 
of graduation gowns).130  Other states have successfully engaged other 
partners.  California’s enhanced prison industry ventures at one time 
included a Trans World Airlines reservations call center in a youth 
detention center.131  Arizona’s ventures included a Best Western 
reservation call center in a women’s prison.132  Connecticut’s included 
the Chesapeake Cap Company (a manufacturer of baseball caps).133  
By 1993, thirty-two correctional agencies were participating in the 
private sector market through PIECP.134  By the end of 2000, a total of 
some 3700 state inmates were participating in PIE;135 by the end of 
                                                                                                                 
guidelines. Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 157.  In some states, guidelines were less 
well received; the Washington State Supreme Court declared the state’s PIE 
unconstitutional. Wash. Water Jet Ski Workers Ass’n v. Yarbrough, 90 P.3d 42 
(Wash. 2004); see Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 273–76. 
 127.  See generally SEXTON, supra note 72. 
 128. Figures are as of 2008. See Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 322. 
 129. See id. at 9. 
 130. See SEXTON, supra note 72, at 7–8. 
 131. See id. at 9–10. 
 132. See id. at 9. 
 133. See id. at 10–11.  For additional partnerships, see also FPI Inmate Programs, 
UNICOR, http://www.unicor.gov/About_FPI_Programs.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 
2014). 
 134. See SEXTON, supra note 72, at 3. 
 135. See THOMAS W. PETERSIK ET AL., IDENTIFYING BENEFICIARIES OF PIE 
INCOMES: WHO BENEFITS FROM WAGE EARNINGS OF INMATES WORKING IN THE 
PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT (PIE) PROGRAM 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-content/uploads/researchfullrpt1.pdf; see also 
MARILYN C. MOSES & CINDY J. SMITH, FACTORIES BEHIND FENCES: DO PRISON 
‘REAL WORK’ PROGRAMS WORK? 33 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/jr000257h.pdf. 
390 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
2005, 6555 inmates were in the program, bringing the total inmate 
participation to 70,000 since its inception.136 
In South Carolina and elsewhere, enhanced prison industries under 
PIECP are more profitable than the older Federal Prison Industries 
program (further discussion below), and both are more profitable 
than traditional prison work programs (license plates, road signs, 
etc.).137  However, the private sector has not been responsive to 
enhanced prison industry initiatives in many states, and a study by 
Thomas Petersik et al., sponsored by the National Corrections 
Institute of America (NCIA) found that the benefits and beneficiaries 
of prison industry enhancement are neither well known nor 
understood.138 
The Petersik et al. study remains the principal source on the 
question of the benefits of the PIE program.  The research team 
asked two questions: Who are the financial beneficiaries of PIE 
wages?  And, what would be the effect of paying PIE employees on 
par with the civilian work force?  The answer to the first question was 
very broad.  Petersik et al. found that fifty-three to fifty-seven cents 
on every dollar of inmate wages goes to beneficiaries other than the 
inmate.139  Non-inmate beneficiaries prominently include the 
corrections system, with approximately one third of inmate wages 
going to his or her room and board costs.140  Other beneficiaries 
include the taxpayers who derive indirect benefit from reduced 
pressure on state budgets due to inmates’ wage contributions.  With 
regard to the effects of improving wages and expanding the program, 
Petersik’s team found that PIE’s profitability and benefits would 
likely increase under both conditions.141 
While PIE’s advocates in corrections and in the private sector are 
attentive to the prospects for assimilating prison labor into the 
economy,142 the thrust of their concerns has mainly been in directions 
other than raising wages.  PIE offers entrepreneurs a competitive 
advantage over the alternative of moving to Mexico or offshore, 
depending on the location of a prison factory relative to its markets, 
among other factors.  One corporate head reported using his PIE 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See MOSES & SMITH, supra note 135. 
 137. See Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 12. 
 138. PETERSIK ET AL., supra note 135, at 7. 
 139. Id. at xii.  PIE inmates in South Carolina have sued over deductions. See 
Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 168. 
 140. See PETERSIK ET AL., supra note 135, at xiii. 
 141. See id. at xvi. 
 142. See Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 178. 
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plant for lower-end products (involving low skill), especially in areas 
of unsteady demand—reserving higher-end products with steadier 
demand for his “civilian” labor force.143  In his view, PIE offered him 
a cushion in the global economy, absorbing fluctuations in demand in 
a way that allowed his firm to maintain maximum profitability in a 
highly competitive global environment.  The director of South 
Carolina’s PIE program, Tony Ellis, also emphasizes the flexibility of 
the prison labor force in his references to PIE as a form of “leased 
labor.”144 
The conditions that have made PIE successful in South Carolina 
involve an approach to prison labor as labor in the global economy.  
The small scale of the PIE program, and the relatively small role of 
organized labor in South Carolina, feature among these conditions, as 
well.145  Following a 1977 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, inmate workers 
are not allowed to organize, and, under South Carolina state law, 
have no private rights in the labor context.146  Proposals to raise wages 
or shift to higher-skilled job training (to maximize post-release job 
opportunities for inmates) have not prevailed—nor have proposals to 
restrict PIE to sectors in which there is no domestic competition (i.e., 
for which there is only an off-shore alternative).147 
To the extent that PIE delivers financial benefits to individuals 
beyond the inmate/employees, the program is apparently most 
successful as a sustainability mechanism for corrections agencies, and 
least successful when it is set up as a means of revenue generation for 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See SEXTON, supra note 72, at 6–7, 9 (quoting Pat Timms, Escod’s Vice 
President of Operations). 
 144. See Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 168, 171 (quoting Tony Ellis). 
 145. See id. at 168 (quoting Tony Ellis). 
 146. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977); see also 
Susan Blankenship, Revisiting the Democratic Promise of Prisoners’ Labor Unions, 
37 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 241 (2005) (proposing that prisoners’ labor unions would 
give a constructive voice to inmates in relation to the prison crisis). 
 147.  See, e.g., BARBARA J. AUERBACH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING PRACTICES: WAGE POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR THE 
PRISON INDUSTRIES ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (PIECP) 2 (2001) 
(“PIECP wages tend to be set at, or slightly above, the Federal minimum wage . . .  
reflecting the entry level, labor intensive nature of PIECP work.”).  Far from limiting 
production to sectors that lack domestic competition, PIECP operations have 
included, inter alia, aluminum screen and circuit board production, glove 
manufacture, alfalfa production, papaya packing in Hawaii, potato processing, and 
boat building. See Marilyn C. Moses & Cindy J. Smith, Factories Behind Fences: Do 
Prison ‘Real Work’ Programs Work?, NAT’L INST. JUST. (June 2007), http://
www.nij.gov/journals/257/pages/real-work-programs.aspx. 
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other parts of state budgets.148  In some states, PIE revenues are 
diverted by the legislature into other programs besides corrections—a 
controversial practice that tends to compromise the viability of PIEs 
in those states.149  Such issues and debates underscore the extent to 
which PIE should be understood as a privatization initiative shaped 
by an ongoing restructuring of state economies within globalization. 
The benefits of PIE are not limited to revenue, however.  The 
program has been presented as contributing to lowered rates of 
recidivism and improvements in post-release employment.  A 2006 
National Institute of Justice study confirmed positive effects for PIE 
alumni/ae in terms of higher rates of employment and lower rates of 
recidivism than those of inmates whose work experience was in other 
prison programs.150  The authors indicate that—given methodological 
constraints—these positive outcomes cannot be conclusively 
attributed to PIE experience specifically, since inmates are not 
randomly assigned to PIE and the other programs.151  Still, they 
emphasize that PIE yields positive outcomes for inmates after release, 
and that it remains an “underutilized option.”152 
The NIJ studies of Petersik et al. and Cindy J. Smith et al.153 
implicitly raise the question as to why the PIE model has not been 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Ragghianti’s study of South Carolina’s experience with PIE emphasizes the 
importance of personal and institutional commitment, clarity of objectives, and 
continuity as additional factors in PIE success. See Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 315.  
A full section of her dissertation charts the highly effective involvement of Tony Ellis, 
director of the state Division of Correction Industries, and former state director of 
procurement. See id. at 161–81.  Ellis had a long and successful tenure as director of 
South Carolina’s PIE program, and was personally involved in recruiting firms.  
Ragghianti credits his success with inspiring other southern corrections agencies—
formerly resistant to PIE—to participate.  At the time of her writing, Ellis had just 
retired, so the long-term success of the South Carolina PIE program beyond his 
directorship remained to be seen.  See id. at 295, n.33. 
 149. See id. at 281. 
 150. See CINDY J. SMITH ET AL., CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES: PREPARING INMATES 
FOR RE-ENTRY: RECIDIVISM AND POST-RELEASE EMPLOYMENT 9 (2006), available at  
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214608.pdf; see also MOSES & SMITH, supra 
note 135, at 33–34. 
 151. See MOSES & SMITH, supra note 135, at 33.  PIE is a voluntary program.  
South Carolina’s eligibility requirements include a GED (or current participation in a 
GED program) and no recent disciplinary infractions in prison. See Ragghianti, supra 
note 120, at 104.  Overall, Petersik et al. find that PIE inmates tend to serve longer 
sentences for more violent crimes, but have a far lower rate of drug-related offenses 
than the general prison population. PETERSIK ET AL., supra note 135, at 96, tbl.A5.  
Longer sentences mean that PIE inmates may have benefitted from other prison 
work programs, and other forms of support. See Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 302. 
 152. See PETERSIK ET AL., supra note 135, at 84; see also MOSES & SMITH, supra 
note 135, at 34–35. 
 153. SMITH ET AL., supra note 150. 
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more widely adopted.  Marie Fajardo Ragghianti’s evaluation study 
points to the gap between the politics and realities of corrections as 
one possible reason154—or rather, a set of reasons including the 
politicization of a distinction between rehabilitation and security155 
and a pervasive disregard for benefits to prisoners.  In spite of the 
favorable outcome assessments by NIJ studies cited above, Congress 
reduced funding for the Bureau of Justice Assistance, resulting in cuts 
to the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives and, in that 
connection, to the PIECP national coordinator’s office.156 
The PIE program was saved, but by that time the national politics 
of privatization had shifted from the sustainability model offered by 
PIE to the revenue-generation model.157  The difference between 
these was, in effect, the difference between treating prisoners as 
earners in a global economy—with all the precarity of non-inmate 
workers in their same employment sector—and prisoners as revenue 
streams flowing directly to state treasuries.  Debates over parity and 
efficiency as competing values in the corrections labor setting remain 
intense.158 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 292–93. 
 155. See id. at 5. 
 156. See id. at 291. 
 157.  See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and 
the Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 869 
(2008) (“‘[P]rison industries’—prison labor programs producing goods or services 
sold to other government agencies or to the private sector—are the highest-profile 
and most controversial form of prison labor.  Since roughly the New Deal era, prison 
industries have been tightly regulated, most prominently through the Ashurst-
Sumners Act’s criminal prohibition on the sale of inmate-produced goods in 
interstate commerce.  Government purchasers always have been exempted, however, 
as part of the broader New Deal-era compromise permitting prison labor for ‘state 
use.’  Limits on other purchases gradually have relaxed over the past thirty years.  
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prisoners.  Today, prison industries generate $2 billion in revenue annually.” 
(footnotes omitted)); cf. Ryan S. Marion, Note, Prisoners for Sale: Making the 
Thirteenth Amendment Case Against Sate Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 214 (2009) (“Private prisons . . .  mimic their public 
counterparts in one interesting aspect: prison labor.  As in state jail, prisoners 
confined by the state to a privately owned facility must perform menial tasks for little 
to no pay.  The point of such work, consequently, is reformation and rehabilitation.  
By doing such work in the private context, however, prisoners directly contribute to 
the profit-making function of the corporation.  At the very least, therefore, inmate 
labor in private prisons constitutes ‘involuntary servitude.’  If the state is 
characterized as ‘contracting out’ inmates to these corporations who subsequently aid 
the prison in earning corporate revenue, the system begins to resemble a modern day 
form of slavery.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 158. See Matthew J. Lang, The Search for a Workable Standard for When Fair 
Labor Standards Act Coverage Should be Extended to Prison Workers, 5 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 191, 194–96 (2002); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
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B. Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) and the Debate Over 
Prison Labor 
PIE is just one initiative aimed at reforming prison labor—one 
whose uptake by states and localities remained highly limited even 
after Congress expanded the maximum PIE certifications from seven 
to fifty.159  But by far the largest prison industries program is the one 
run by the federal government—Federal Prison Industries, Inc., now 
known by its trade name UNICOR.160  All federal prisoners are 
required to work, unless they are physically unable or exempted as 
security risks.161  Most prison work involves inmates in the work of the 
prison itself, or in production of goods for other state agencies with 
limited market value, such as license plates and road signs, among 
other things.  This type of prison labor is conventionally referred to as 
“traditional” prison labor.  UNICOR, which employs about twenty-
two percent of all federal prisoners,162 involves a different model, 
                                                                                                                 
GAO/GGD-93-98, PRISONER LABOR: PERSPECTIVES ON PAYING THE FEDERAL 
MINIMUM WAGE 1–2 (1993) available at, http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/217999.pdf.  
The GAO’s report is a response to a request by Senator Harry Reid (D-NV), for a 
projection as to how paying the minimum wage to inmate workers would affect the 
corrections system. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra.  Prison professionals 
anticipated “millions” of unrecoverable expenses if they were required to pay 
minimum wage; other organizations participating in PIE or similar programs saw 
advantages in parity. See id.  Senator Reid’s request was in the context of a recent 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals three-judge panel holding that prisoners employed in 
private companies were employees of the state, entitled to protection under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938. See id.  Reid wanted to know if Congress should 
specifically exclude inmate workers from FLSA. See id.  Senator Reid subsequently 
was among the co-sponsors of a bill to amend the FLSA to exempt prison labor from 
its provisions; however, the bill never reached the floor of the Senate. See S. 1943, 
104th Cong. (1996). 
 159. On expansion of the program, see UNICOR, http://www.unicor.gov (last 
visited June 27, 2014).  Even on this expanded scale, participation remains marginal.  
In 1997, less than 0.2% of federal prisoners were participating in PIE. See Options to 
Improve and Expand Federal Prison Industries: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 59 (1997) [hereinafter Options 
to Improve and Expand Federal Prison Industries], available at http://commdocs.
house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju58956.000/hju58956_0f.htm.  Florida developed its 
own program, Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises, Inc. 
(PRIDE) to bring private enterprise into the physical space of state prisons. See 
PRIDE, http://www.pride-enterprises.org (last visited June 27, 2014); see also Prison 
Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises, Inc., FLA. DEP’T 
CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1011/pride.html (last visited Sept. 
28, 2014). 
 160. See About UNICOR, UNICOR, http://www.unicor.gov./about.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
 161. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2905, 104 Stat 4789, 
4914. 
 162. See UNICOR, supra note 22, at 28. 
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conventionally known as “prison industries.”163  Inmates involved in 
UNICOR produce goods for sale on the open market—under specific 
conditions aimed at minimizing competition with the private sector, 
and avoiding displacement of civilian labor.  Its market is protected 
by a mandatory sourcing rule, requiring all federal agencies to give 
preference to UNICOR’s goods and services in their own 
procurement practices (with certain exceptions). 
UNICOR is the trademark of what is also known as Federal Prison 
Industries, Inc. (FPI).164  FPI was established in 1934 by President 
Roosevelt as an effort to coordinate prison industries nationwide so 
as to minimize disruption of civilian labor in any one sector of 
production.165  The program was reauthorized in 1948.166  FPI 
supported defense industries during the Second World War, the 
Korean War, and the war in Vietnam.167  After the end of the 
Vietnam War, it developed a diversified portfolio of goods and 
services for sale.168  In some respects, FPI took its modern form as a 
corporation (i.e., independent spending authority, without 
Congressional appropriation) with the passage of the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988.169  Under this statute, it was required to be self-
supporting, and to comply with several conditions before selling its 
products on the open market—legislative efforts that reflected larger 
concerns with tax burdens and private sector competitiveness in the 
national and international economy. 
Federal Prison Industries, Inc., is now known both as FPI, Inc. and 
UNICOR.  UNICOR’s in-house historical narrative credits Chief 
Justice Burger’s “factories with fences” concept as the inspiration for 
its current form, although it is not clear that UNICOR represents a 
specific implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations.170  The 
Chief Justice’s Task Force is discussed in the next section.  One 
principle difference between the Task Force recommendations and 
UNICOR as practiced is that UNICOR does not claim rehabilitation 
                                                                                                                 
 163. FPI General Overviews FAQs, UNICOR, http://www.unicor.gov/FAQ_
General.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2015). 
 164. See id. 
 165. The FPI was authorize by the Act of June 23, 1934, Pub. L. 73-461, 48 Stat. 
1211, and Exec. Order No. 6917; see also O’BRYANT, supra note 70, at 12. 
 166. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32380, FEDERAL PRISON 
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 170. UNICOR, supra note, at 22 at 2. 
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as its primary goal; indeed, UNICOR is explicit in stating that 
rehabilitation is not the primary goal that it was in the past.171  Rather, 
UNICOR has adopted what the website refers to as a “balanced 
model”—combining “punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation” 
with rehabilitation.172  Another key difference involves the prison 
industries themselves, which are not owned by the private sector as 
envisioned in the Task Force report. 
UNICOR is self-supporting, and there is no federal appropriation 
for its operations.  The principal source of its revenue is sales.  
Approximately seventy-four percent of sales revenues are used for 
the purchase of materials.173  Inmates are paid wages, but their net 
share is considerably less than that of PIE participants (six percent, 
compared to about forty-three to forty-seven percent in PIE).174 Still, 
UNICOR is more remunerative for inmates than traditional forms of 
prison labor; most wages under traditional prison labor regimes are 
charged back to the agencies for the prisoner’s upkeep.175 
UNICOR is a product of the New Deal rather than the age of 
neoliberalism, and its recent history is indicative of tensions between 
these two paradigms of liberalism.  In the 1980’s, fifty years after its 
inception, UNICOR became controversial, subject to a spate of 
Congressional legislative initiatives, hearings, and evaluation projects; 
these continue today.  The main debates involve competition with the 
private sector, the enforcement of (and exceptions to) the mandatory 
source rule, the level of wages of inmate workers, and overall 
effectiveness as a prison program.  The effectiveness questions appear 
to have been settled by independent studies of recidivism and other 
aspects of former inmates’ post-release experiences.176  An 
independent study, mandated by Congress in 1991, confirmed 
minimal displacement of civilian labor,177 but competition and 
mandatory sourcing have remained contentious.  In key respects, the 
debates reflect wider policy debates (i.e., outside of the prison 
context) over wages, social security, and free trade—with UNICOR’s 
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 173. JAMES, supra note 166, at Summary. 
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 175. See MOSES & SMITH, supra note 135, at 34; PETERSIK ET AL., supra note 135, 
at 19. 
 176. UNICOR, supra note 22, at 26; see also JAMES, supra note 166, at 7. 
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reliance on market protections coming under steady challenge, as its 
critics (from the right and the left, for different reasons) pushed for 
more competitive sourcing for government agencies, and for wage 
parity under the Fair Labor Standards Act.178 
Almost immediately after passage of the 1988 law that repositioned 
UNICOR in relation to private sector markets, bills from both sides 
of the aisle—most of which failed—were repeatedly introduced in 
Congress in an effort to revise or repeal the mandatory sourcing 
rule.179  Congressional hearings in 1997 were intended to resolve 
tensions between UNICOR and its various critical camps by 
recalibrating the linkage between mandatory sourcing and civilian 
competition—in part by adjusting the sourcing rule, and in part by 
promoting UNICOR’s production of goods and services that had 
migrated offshore.180  The hearings made plain the wide range of 
views—from a critique of prison industries as “‘quasi-slave’ labor,”181 
to endorsements of PIE182 and PRIDE,183 to advocacy for specific 
proposals to eliminate the mandatory sourcing rule,184 among other 
reforms of UNICOR.  Subsequent hearings and revisions of the 
mandatory source rule led to greater procurement flexibility on the 
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159, at 8–11 (statement of Rep. McCollum, Chairman, Judiciary Subcomm. on 
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 181. See id. at 14–16 (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee, Member, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
 182. See id. at 34–36 (statement of Robert Sanders Division of Prison Industries, 
S.C. Dep’t of Corrs.). 
 183. See id. at 24–33 (statement of Michael N. Harrell, Gen. Manager of New Bus. 
Dev., Pride Enters.); id. at 42–49 (statement of Kenneth Mellem, President & CEO, 
Geonex Corp.). 
 184. See id. at 50–56 (statement of Morgan O. Reynolds, Director, Crim. Justice 
Ctr., Nat’l Ctr. for Policy Analysis). 
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part of federal agencies, particularly the Department of Defense and 
the CIA.185 
While the prison population continued to increase in the 2000’s,186 
prison industries slumped in 2010 and suffered a loss of profitability 
over at least the next three fiscal years187—reflecting the impact of the 
global economic crisis on consumers (even large institutional 
consumers such as government agencies), as well as prison industries’ 
new exposure to competition.  The political rhetoric surrounding 
federal prison industries shifted increasingly to a financialized model 
at the same time that it reduced the market protections for prison-
made goods and services—and during the same period when prison 
industries themselves shifted increasingly away from both the 
discourse and practice of inmate rehabilitation.188  While a causal link 
between these two broad developments (financialization and 
punishment) is unlikely to be found, they may be seen as related 
historically and functionally—given the simultaneous pressures on 
correctional agencies to both discipline offenders and capitalize on 
inmates’ potential to contribute to corrections revenue streams.189 
C. Reforming Prisons Through Privatization: Two Models 
1. Privatizing Inmate Labor: Chief Justice Burger’s Task Force 
Model 
As noted in Part I, privatization was well-established as a principle 
of government administration long before private prisons were on the 
horizon.  In the 1970s, the Department of Justice developed a 
package of reforms of the prison labor system, envisioning a role for 
private industry within prisons—as an innovation in rehabilitation, 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See JAMES, supra note 166, at 2; O’BRYANT, supra note 70, at 1. 
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and an improvement on the Federal Industries System.190  Chief 
Justice Warren Burger was personally committed to prison labor 
reform along these lines and is credited with having formulated the 
“factories with fences” phrase that was widely associated with the 
concept.191  He was instrumental in convening a meeting in 1984, co-
sponsored by the Johnson Foundation and the Brookings Institutions, 
that led to the development of a National Task Force on Prison 
Industries in February, 1985.192  The Task Force led in turn to an 
extensive deliberation process involving representatives of the bench, 
the bar, corrections professionals, academics, business and labor 
leaders, and members of the Senate and House of Representatives; 
their meetings resulted in a series of principles and recommendations 
that were published in June, 1986.193  Their recommendations resulted 
in the formation of the National Center for Innovations in 
Corrections, an advisory group for states and localities interested in 
reform. 
The overall purpose embraced by the Task Force was to transform 
prison labor into a platform for reforming the entire prison system 
around principles of rehabilitation and improvement of inmates’ post-
release prospects.194  The recommendations included an 
organizational structure combining internal and external governance 
structures for prison industries, with inmate participation in both 
bodies.195  A strong role for organized labor alongside business was 
also envisioned.  Overall management of the prison would remain 
with the corrections agency. 
Meanwhile, Congressional hearings on prison industries reform, 
including members of Congress and witnesses who were also 
participating in the Task Force as members of the advisory board or 
as committee members, followed in 1985.196  The proposed reforms by 
the Task Force sought an expansion of the private sector role 
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established for states by the Justice Systems Improvement Act of 
1979,197 for all levels of the correction system.  The recommendations 
also included reforms aimed at developing parity of conditions for 
inmate workers relative to the civilian workforce—setting limits to 
the work day and work week, wages at the federal minimum wage, 
affirming the right to organize, and other measures aimed at bringing 
to an end the exploitation and abuses of the old contract labor and 
leasing practices.198  As we have discussed above, Congress 
established PIE and subjected UNICOR to the constraints of 
privatization, but it did not include prison workers under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. 
2. Privatizing Prison Financialization: President Reagan’s 
Privatization Commission Model 
Privatization drew the interest of President Reagan, as well, though 
on different terms crafted primarily around economic competitiveness 
as a driver of innovation and efficiency.  The President’s Commission 
on Privatization was created by Executive Order 12607 on September 
2, 1987.199  The Commission Report’s discussion of prison 
privatization opens with reference to prison crowding,200 but makes no 
mention of the Congressional legislation that established mandatory 
minimum sentences in 1984.  The section on prison privatization 
consists of eight recommendations supporting privatization as 
“effective and appropriate” for federal, state, and local 
governments.201  The Commission encourages experimentation and 
research involving contracting at the Bureau of Prisons and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, including the federal 
demonstration project202 that a full ten years later—after much 
debate—yielded the Taft Correctional Institution.203 
The President’s Commission report acknowledges criticisms of 
prison privatization, particularly with respect to the idea of 
corrections as a core governmental function appropriate for the 
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public sector, as well as issues of liability and accountability.204  They 
dealt with these via assurances of experts.  Regarding standards, the 
Commission relied on the testimony of public and private corrections 
professionals, among others, to affirm that the standards of the 
American Corrections Association, as well as Constitutional and 
other legal requirements, could hold private corrections to 
appropriate performance.205  Liability could also be dealt with 
contractually.  Regarding accountability, their position was that 
“contract prison operations can add another layer of accountability” 
to corrections.206 
Overall, the section of the Commission report on prison 
privatization was almost wholly given over to the financialization of 
prison production, up to and including the ownership and operation 
of an entire prison and its operations.207  This emphasis is consistent 
with the priorities of the privatization movement, as discussed in 
previous sections.  We underscore this parallel as evidence of support 
for prison privatization independent of—and earlier than—the prison 
crowding crisis. 
3. The Task Force and the President’s Commission, Compared 
The labor orientation of the Chief Justice’s Task Force was focused 
primarily on internal reform of the corrections system, to eliminate 
abuses and improve the post-release prospects for inmates.  While the 
Task Force did not ignore the potential for relief of tax burdens with 
broader participation of the private sector, its principles and 
recommendations were largely devoted to reorganizing institutional 
structures, lines of communication and accountability, and system-
wide relationships—all aimed at improving a person’s life after 
release from prison. The Task Force dealt specifically with prison 
labor; its path mapped a terrain of labor reform.208  As noted above, 
Congress did not implement its full recommendations, particularly 
those most immediately affecting the prisoner as worker—i.e., wages, 
hours, and the right to organize.  As also noted above, Congress 
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adopted PIECP in 1979, introducing privately owned factories into 
prisons as envisioned by the Task Force—a partial success. 
The President’s Commission, on the other hand, was concerned 
with privatization in general, very much along the lines of the 
privatization movement as articulated by the Heritage Foundation 
and the Reason Foundation, which continue to promote prison 
privatization in the context of broader reforms of government.209  The 
Commission report included prison privatization as one section 
among many.  In general, the Commission’s recommendations—in 
the prison context as well as others—mapped a terrain involving a 
new financialization of government, so as to better meet the 
challenges and opportunities of global economic competition, as 
defined by the Commission’s members. 
The financialization model—essentially aimed at reducing fixed 
costs (such as prisoner upkeep), maximizing economic efficiencies, 
and, where possible, expanding revenue streams—has become 
familiar to anyone who has been following public affairs in even the 
most casual way, given the dominance of that model in public policy 
since the late 1980s.  But the labor reform model is likely less familiar, 
given the extent to which minimum wage and collective bargaining 
remain points of controversy and resistance within the Congress and 
in many states.210  Thus, a comment like the following—the opening 
lines of the Chief Justice’s Task Force report—presents terms of 
debate that might be unfamiliar to readers whose experience of the 
privatization debate has been entirely in terms of competitiveness and 
efficiency: 
Public attention to prisons, the kinds of people in them, and 
the activities that take place “behind the walls” is at an 
unprecedented high level in our nation.  Perhaps at no other 
time in our history has such interest been manifested 
simultaneously by citizens and public and private leaders at 
federal, state and local levels.  Of highest interest is the work 
inmates perform in prison, or prison industries.211 
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The differences between these approaches remain unresolved 
within the federal government—debates over prison industries 
continuing to contend over wages and competitiveness, and debates 
over full privatization struggling over the monetization of 
incarceration rates, among other things. 
In conclusion to Part II, we have discussed two principal 
approaches to privatization that developed within the federal 
government over the course of the 1970s and 1980s.  The more recent 
program, PIE, emphasizes private enterprise production for 
consumption on the open market.  The older model, Federal Prison 
Industries/UNICOR, emphasizes prison enterprise within a market 
guaranteed by a mandatory sourcing rule as applied to government 
agencies.  Both models operate within public prisons, underscoring 
the extent to which prison privatization does not automatically 
distinguish private prisons from public ones, but links them through 
the prison labor context.  Prison labor has a far longer history than 
either of these modern initiatives, but we have emphasized these 
because of the insights they afford with respect to contemporary 
issues in prison privatization, bridging public and private prisons, and 
in relation to the broader significance of privatization in relation to 
the neoliberalization of global capital. 
CONCLUSION 
Our purpose in the previous sections has been to contribute to a 
reframing of the discussion of prison privatization by exploring its 
American formation in the privatization movement, particularly in 
relation to prison labor.  Part I reviewed privatization in the form of 
outsourcing as a mode of governance that is central to the 
contemporary ways in which government now operates.  In Part II, 
we explored the roots of prison privatization in relation to the 
privatization movement, as it was diversely taken up within the 
federal government.  We found that labor was the context in which 
privatization—for better or for worse—was first and most enduringly 
incorporated into the prison system.  Adjusting the chronology of 
modern prison privatization to correspond to the history of the 
privatization movement makes visible the extent to which the 
subsequent deepening of the prison crisis was—in terms of 
resources—at least in part a consequence of the application of the 
financialization model to prison management, governmental 
budgeting, contracting, and monitoring.  That policy choice was well 
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rehearsed (so to speak) in other areas of the government reshaped by 
neoliberalization.212 
Seen in light of this larger and more complex context, prison labor 
is—to a degree that might be surprising—continuous with the civilian 
labor force in its vulnerabilities to fluctuations in demand, pricing, 
social supports, and various forms of rights.213  Indeed, some 
proponents of prison industries have advocated for managing wages 
and barring union activity so as to maintain competitive advantage 
over the off-shore alternatives.  Debates over UNICOR highlight 
controversies over wages, collective bargaining, and free trade.214  
Debates over PIE highlight the narrow conditions under which U.S. 
labor is able to maintain a competitive advantage over offshore labor 
in the global marketplace.  Throughout this same period, minimum 
wage, benefits, protections, and the right to organize were subjects of 
debate with respect to the civilian labor force as well.  To this extent, 
we may look to prison labor to see what global competitive advantage 
looks like from domestic ground.   
From this standpoint, debates surrounding the privatization of 
inmate labor are of a piece with debates over wages, benefits, and 
collective bargaining outside of the prison context.  We emphasize the 
importance of this finding, as it suggests that the appropriate context 
for analyzing prison privatization cannot be set wholly within prison 
walls.  In particular, the issues of competition with the private sector 
and incentivizing firms to “insource”215 are reminders of the extent to 
which inmate labor is—in these respects—a difference of degree, and 
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before a House committee hearing on Federal Prison Industries. See generally 
Options to Improve and Expand Federal Prison Industries, supra note 159. 
 215. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, President 
Obama Issues Call to Action to Invest in America at White House “Insourcing 
American Jobs” Forum (Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/01/11/president-obama-issues-call-action-invest-america-white-
house-insourcing. 
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not of kind, with civilian labor.  Wages, benefits, social security, and 
other protections, as well as the right to organize, are issues in 
political contention that affect the workforce at large.  Moreover, 
prisons are not the only context in which labor is highly constrained.  
The maquiladoras of northern Mexico, the high-tech workshops of 
China, and other locations where offshore workers’ labor for U.S. 
firms in highly constrained living and working conditions, may be 
usefully compared to the inmate labor situation.216  Military prisons 
are also part of the FPI/UNICOR system, but beyond that specific 
connection, military work—as work—also invites productive 
comparisons.217 
This broader context suggests some limitations to approaching 
prison privatization primarily as a contrast with public prisons, 
beyond the fact that privatized labor spans both regimes.  To be sure, 
the conceptual distinction between public and private is of value 
philosophically in relation to the different accountabilities of 
government and business, to democracy, and to shareholders, 
respectively.  For this very reason, in more pragmatic terms, public 
and private values or interests may not be on the same spectrum, 
since government and private companies are held to different 
accountabilities and rationales; they are also subject to different 
formulations of success. 
The debates over prison labor underscore the extent to which 
“privatization” and “neoliberalism” are not monoliths, except 
perhaps in their most ideologically framed terms.  They are rubrics 
for diverse models and approaches, and as such, they are open to 
different values, expectations, and institutional norms.218  From this 
standpoint, standard keywords from the privatization movement and 
its critics—binaries such as public/private and law/market, and 
monoliths such as neoliberalism and globalization—do not do justice 
to the specifics associated with particular sectors of governmental or 
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entrepreneurial activity, nor to the history by which financialization 
came to the fore as the prevailing policy concern.  Such binary 
approaches limit our imaginations when it comes to reforming 
prisons, both public and private.  The roads not taken—or paths that 
may yet emerge—become more visible once prison labor is taken into 
account.  Viewed as a workplace, corrections cannot be fully or 
automatically assimilated to private enterprise, given that inmates are 
required to work, and do not participate in setting the value of their 
own labor.  That said, constraints on the non-prison workforce in 
terms of choice in a precarious labor market are not of a wholly 
different order. 
Overall, refocusing discussion of prison privatization to include the 
wider relevance of prison labor underscores the constraints of a 
concept of privatization limited to financialization, and to prison 
privatization solely in terms of efficiencies in prison construction and 
management.  In what appears to be the prevailing model for federal 
and state prisoners, inmates are cost points to be mitigated by various 
strategies for minimizing costs, including their own contributions to 
revenue generation.  Financialization extends to contracts and 
monitoring as well, as private firms may be held to a certain 
capacity—or as firms in turn hold the contracting state agency to 
maintaining a certain rate of capacity.219 
Our analysis points to the vital importance of contracts and 
monitoring as sites where prisoners’ wellbeing and post-release 
prospects can be protected in the private prison context.220  
The contracting process can be constructed in ways that enhance 
such prospects, as well as the democratic process surrounding 
corrections.  In this regard, a first and crucial step would be to 
acknowledge that private prisons involve a special form of 
procurement that requires more than regulation of the bidding 
process and conditions for payment.  Prisoners—human beings with 
human needs—cannot reasonably be covered with the same sort of 
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contract and contract processes that are used, for example, to 
construct a bridge or build a road.221  Non-marketized values are not 
easily expressed in contract form, and private providers are therefore 
unlikely to face checks—even with the most robust monitoring—if 
they are required only to cut costs so as to maintain profitability and 
shareholder value.  Contracts for private prisons should be open to 
fully informed public debate, especially when it comes to advocating 
for provisions that might add additional protections and services for 
prisoners.222 
To this end, the public needs to be more fully involved when it 
comes to certain procedural and substantive contract provisions 
involving prisons.  Procedurally, the proposed contract itself should 
be made public, perhaps on the contacting agency’s own website, not 
unlike a proposed agency rule made available for comment.  What 
arrangements have been made for prison health care?  Such 
provisions should be made public before such decisions are made and 
members of the public should have a chance to comment on them.  
More substantively, the comments might also include advocacy for 
the inclusion of certain provisions dealing with, for example, the 
enhancement of the educational opportunities for the prisoners 
involved, or specifically, what might be done to decrease the rates of 
recidivism overall?  What benchmarks and goals are written into 
these contracts that require such efforts? 
For the public to be effectively involved, information must be 
gathered and made public concerning the track records of those 
competing for these contracts, and information and monitoring must 
occur throughout the duration of the contract once it is awarded.  
This may involve innovative forms of monitoring and information 
sharing.  Contracts could, at a minimum, include liability rules that 
incentivize the private firms to carry out their responsibilities in a 
constitutionally appropriate way.  While it may be difficult at present 
for courts to hold private prison providers constitutionally liable for 
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the negligent behavior of prison guards,223 such liability rules can be 
spelled out in the contracts involved.  By negotiating for contractual 
provisions that extend liability for constitutional torts to the private 
corporations now managing prisons, stronger incentive for private 
providers to minimize the kinds of behavior that can adversely affect 
the health and wellbeing of prisoners would result.  Monitoring 
should also be public—including attention to human rights and fair 
labor standards.  To this end, the contracts might also include clauses 
designating the prisoners themselves as third party beneficiaries of 
these contracts, thereby authorizing them to sue if they believe its 
provisions have been breached.224  There should be no penalty against 
inmates who file legal complaints, even if their claim is subsequently 
dismissed or not granted. 
While the political mainstreaming of privatization has involved 
constant repetition of the mantra favoring markets over government 
as reflecting values of competition and individual liberty over 
constraints and state control, the relevance of privatization in the 
prison context has been more obviously in relation to developments 
elsewhere—trumping organized labor and sidestepping political 
opposition to government expenditures for social security and various 
forms of protection for workers in state legislatures and the Congress.  
Inmate laborers in this sense share very directly in the condition of 
the general labor force in their common sectors of industry, and 
improving their status as beneficiaries of their own labor cannot be 
separated from the parallel question on the other side of the prison 
walls.  A focus on their post-release integration highlights such 
parallels, as inmates face re-incorporation into workplaces as well as 
their families and communities.  The restoration of voting rights for 
prisoners should also be considered.225 
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Our analysis also implies that discussion of approaches to 
regulating prison privatization should not be focused solely on prisons 
per se, but should also extend to privatization and outsourcing more 
generally, and to the social security of underserved communities, 
including labor security.  This may mean developing a new approach 
to regulation—one that is more open to due process and democratic 
participation—to ensure maximum fairness for inmates, together with 
their communities, whatever the entity may be that carries out the 
public’s charge.  Our goal in this analysis has been to suggest the 
extent to which private prisons belong to a larger set of trends by 
which collective forms of social responsibility—whether for prisoners 
or others—has been increasingly placed by the government into the 
hands of private firms along lines consistent with prevailing forms of 
neoliberal capitalism.  In the prison labor context, this has resulted in 
a paradoxical situation in which the advantages claimed for 
privatization cannot be achieved without legislative supports of 
various kinds—to make work a requirement, suppress wages, and 
manipulate market competition.  Appreciating privatization in 
relation to globalization draws attention to the wider significance of 
that paradox—and, we hope, to the relevance of rethinking the limits 
of privatization for all of us, from the prisoners’ side of the wall. 
 
                                                                                                                 
disparate impact on African-Americans and other minority groups . . . .  In three 
states, at least one out of every five African-American adults is disenfranchised: 
Florida (23%), Kentucky (22%), and Virginia (20%).” AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
DEMOCRACY IMPRISONED: A REVIEW OF THE PREVALENCE AND IMPACT OF FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2013), available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_ICCPR%20Felony%20Disenfranchi
sement%20Shadow%20Report.pdf. See generally Katzenstein et al., supra note 24. 
